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ABSTRACT 
This thesis concerns the distinction between public and private law in English administrative 
law, concentrating upon judicial remedies and procedures. 
Chapter 1 of the thesis examines the circumstances that led to the decision of the House of 
Lords in O'Reilly v. Mackman (that in some cases public law issues may be raised only by 
Application for Judicial Review (AJR) under RSC Order 53) and outlines in broad terms the 
problems for litigants which the decision has posed. Also discussed is the "obverse" of the 
O'Reilly rule, laid down in R v. East Berks. Area Health Authority, ex parte Walsh (CA), 
that disputes raising no public law issue cannot be litigated by AJR. 
Chapter 2 examines ^%i-0'Reilly cases in which public law issues have been permissibly 
raised other than by AJR. These are cases in which a public law matter has had to be 
resolved in order to settle a dispute concerning liability in either private or criminal law. It 
is concluded that the recent decision of the House of Lords in Roy v. Kensington Family 
Practitioner Committee leaves unresolved some of the uncertainties in this area. 
In O'Reilly, and in other cases, public law has been defined in terms of the scope of the 
prerogative remedies. The scope of certiorari is accordingly considered in chapter 3, where 
it is observed that the courts have effected a significant extension of public law - an 
extension which may continue into areas once axiomatically "private". Chapter 4 examines 
when a statutory duty is enforceable by action for damages and when, by contrast, only 
mandamus or injunction upon an AJR are available. 
Chapter 5 concludes with an overview of the problems caused by both O'Reilly and ex parte 
Walsh. To the extent that advocates of reform have seen obstacles in their path, those 
obstacles, it is concluded, are possibly iUusory. 
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V I 
T H E PUBLIC/PRIVATE LAW HEADACHE: 
R E L I E F FOR SUFFERERS? 
CHAPTER ONE: PREFATORY 
Introduction 
This thesis concerns the distinction between public and private law in English administrative 
law, concentrating upon judicial remedies and procedures. 
The notion of a public/private law divide is still regarded in many quarters with suspicion. 
For example Lord Wilberforce, in a well-known dictum', has warned against any 
deployment of the terms public and private law that might give to public authorities some 
legal advantage denied to the private citizen -"for English law fastens typically not upon 
principles but upon remedies". However in the sphere of remedies a distinction can, of 
course, be found. For it is trite law that, whilst the remedy of damages can be obtained in 
appropriate circumstances against both private citizens and public authorities, it is only 
certain acts of public authorities that can be controlled by the prerogative orders of certiorari, 
prohibition or mandamus. 
This is not to say that the distinction is in all respects clear between the types of wrong that 
wil l attract each sort of remedy. Formerly (for reasons that will be explained^) this 
uncertainty caused no greater embarrassment to litigants than did the question of whether it 
was worth proceeding at all against a given defendant. Recently, however, the position has 
been complicated by the fact that public law wrongs must now in some cases be litigated by 
a specialised procedure incorporating protection for public authorities against tardy or 
vexatious htigation. I f a remedy is sought in proceedings designed to vindicate private rights 
the claim wil l fail, even i f it is apparent that a claim pursued through the correct mechanism 
would have been successful. How has this state of affairs come about? 
' Davy V. Spelthorne BC [1984] AC 262 at 276. 
^ Below, "Defining the problem". 
The background to O'Reilly v. Mackman^ - the Law Commission Report, "Remedies 
in Administrative Law"."* 
The case law of the 1960's and early 1970's brought about what Professor Wade has called 
a "renaissance" in English Administrative Law.^ In Ridge v. Baldwin^ the House of Lords 
restored the proper scope of judicial supervision of "official" acts and decisions, by 
effectively abolishing the requirement that certiorari would Ue only to "judicial" bodies. 
Moreover cases such as Anisminic and Pactfield! gave an expanded definition to the types 
of error which might lead to such official action being struck down. Such was the scale of 
judicial activity in this period that Lord Reid's observation in Ridge^ that "We do not have 
a developed system of administrative law" was an entirely inappropriate description of the 
law as it stood only fourteen years later.' 
The detaUed background to these developments and their wider impact must be sought 
elsewhere.'" However one consequence of the renaissance was to direct attention to tiie 
remedies of administrative law - which operated in a quite unsystematic fashion. In particular 
tiie procedure for obtaining the prerogative orders of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus 
had been found over the years to work to the disadvantage of litigants in a number of 
respects. The judges' endeavours to circumvent tiiese difficulties, sanctioning the use by way 
of alternative of the remedies and procedures of the civil law, whilst helpful, were 
nonetheless Umited by other factors. The result was, in the words of the Law Commission, 
that "a litigant [seeking judicial review] may find himself in a dilemma. The scope and 
^ [1982] 3 AH ER 1124 (HL). 
" Law Comm. No. 73 (1976), Cmnd. 6407. For earlier suggestions and proposals see 
Law Comm. No. 20 (1969), Cmnd. 4059; Working Paper No. 40 (1971). 
^ "Constitutional Fundamentals", (revised edn., 1989) at p.79. 
* [1964] AC 40. 
^ Anisminic v. Foreign Compensation Commission [1969] 2 AC 147 (HL); Padfield v. 
Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food [1968] AC 997 (HL). See also Congreve v. 
Home Office [1976] QB 629 (CA). 
* At 72. 
' Per Lord Diplock in O'Reilly v. Mackman (supra) at 1130, referring to 1977. 
See Wade, "Administrative Law" 6th Edn (1989) (hereafter "Wade A.L."), parts IV-
V I ; De Smitii, "Judicial Review of Administrative Action" 4tii Edn (1980) by J M Evans 
(hereafter "De Smith J.R.A.A."), Parts 2 & 3. 
procedural particularities of one remedy may suit one case except in one respect; but another 
remedy which is not deficient in this respect may well be unsatisfactory from other points 
of view"." 
Undoubtedly the fact that some of the landmark cases of the renaissance - in particular 
Anisminic and Ridge - were civil actions for a declaration both pointed up the deficiencies 
of the prerogative orders and emphasised the limits of the civil law alternative. What 
precisely were these deficiencies and limitations?'^ 
Challenging "official" action - procedural and remedial choices. 
Classically it is to the prerogative remedies that a litigant'^ must turn where, lacking a 
cause of acUon in private law and alleging no crime, he is nonetheless aggrieved by an act 
or decision of a public authority. The two principal defects of the procedure for invoking 
these remedies prior to 1977 stemmed from its essenfially summary character. First, evidence 
was taken on affidavit, not orally, with no provision for cross-examination. Accordingly the 
procedure was ill-adapted to deal with disputes of fact.'" Secondly there was no express 
provision for discovery of documents or the administration of interrogatories. Had the 
plaintiffs in Anisminic proceeded by application for certiorari, rather than for a declaration 
of nullity, the absence of discovery would have defeated them.'^ 
" Law Comm. No. 73 at para 31. 
'^  For detailed discussion see Law Comm. No. 73; O'Reilly v. Mackman (supra). 
'^  ie an individual suing in his own name (and excluding those who take advantage of 
statutory appeal procedures against a particular administrative decision). It was, and 
presumably remains, possible for an individual to attempt to persuade the Attorney-General 
to apply for an injunction or declaration to restrain the commission of a crime or any wrong 
in respect of which a prerogative remedy is in theory available (the so-called relator action). 
For details see De Smith J.R.A.A. p 449-50. I f the Attorney-General refuses, his decision 
cannot be reviewed by the courts - see Gouriet v. Union of Post Office Workers [1978] AC 
435 (HL). 
In O'Reilly Lord Diplock offered by way of explanation the fact that a "tribunal or 
authority's findings of fact, as distinguished from the legal consequences of the facts that 
they have found, are not open to review by the court in the exercise of its supervisory 
powers" (at 1132). However there are, as his Lordship acknowledged, exceptions. 
'^  For another example see Barnard v.National Dock Labour Board [1953] 2 QB 18. 
These shortcomings, combined with the rule, mentioned above and not abandoned until 
Ridge V . Baldwin, that certiorari would issue in respect only of judicial acts, caused Utigants 
to turn, with the sanction of the courts'*, to the remedies of declaration and, to a lesser 
extent, injunction as alternatives to prerogative relief. The significance of the former remedy 
as a means of controUing "official" acts had emerged in Dyson v. Attorney-General^'^. In 
tiiat case a taxpayer had obtained a declaration that the Revenue had no power to demand, 
under threat of penalty, certain information about his financial affairs. With regard to the 
injunction, it had been established in Boyce v. Paddington Borough Council^^ that the 
remedy could avail an individual who had suffered special damage through interference with 
a public right, irrespective of any interference with his private rights." 
However this relaxed attitude to procedural matters was purchased at a price. For tht 
procedure for seeking a prerogative remedy was hedged about with a number of safeguards 
designed to protect public authorities from excessive or tardy litigation.^" Ordinarily tiiese 
safeguards could be evaded only where the Attorney-General thought that the public interest 
warranted it.^' Yet the disadvantages under which were placed litigants seeking prerogative 
relief were considered to outweigh this wider interest.^ ^ 
See eg Vine v. National Dock Labour Board [1957] AC 488 (HL). 
[1911] 1 KB 410; [1912] 1 Ch 158. 
[1903] 1 Ch 109. See tiie criticism of this case in Emery & Smytiie, "Judicial Review" 
(1986) at p. 250 n.l4. 
" Cf Lonrho, Ltd v. Shell Petroleum Co, Ltd [1981] 2 AU ER 456 (HL), discussed in 
chap. 4 (text following n. 245) and chap. 5, n. 326. 
^ The applicant had to obtain the leave of the court to pursue his case; the application 
had to be supported by an uberrima fides affidavit (described by Lord Diplock in O'Reilly 
at 1130); and in the case of certiorari a six month time limit applied. 
^' Above n. 13. It may be that proof of special damage will also overcome the public 
interest in ensuring that only the Attorney-General (and Local Autiiorities proceeding under 
S.222 of the Local Government Act 1972) can seek an injunction in support of the criminal 
law. For this view, and the details of that public interest, see Gouriet (supra n. 13). 
See especiaUy Vine v. National Dock Labour Board, supra. 
Limits on the utility of the private law remedies. 
But the new attitude was far from a remedial panacea. In particular, a declaration could not 
quash errors within jurisdiction^^. Moreover, such errors could not be challenged collaterally 
and because the Divisional Court had no power to award damages it followed that where an 
invalid (but not void) decision resulted in interference with private rights, an aggrieved 
individual had to begin two wholly separate sets of proceedings to obtain the desired 
redress.^ 
This problem could be avoided in some cases by an injunction to restrain enforcement of an 
invalid decision within jurisdiction. However, apart from the obvious limitation where the 
harm to private rights had already occurred, injunctions could not be obtained against a 
Minister of the Crown.^' 
A final obstacle was that the rules of standing to seek the private law remedies were 
sometimes more restrictive than the equivalent rules for the prerogative orders.^ * 
Punton V. Ministry of Pensions and National Insurance [1963] 1 WLR 186; Same v. 
Same (No 2) [1964] 1 WLR 226. For an explanation of die reasoning behind this rule see 
Craig "AdminisU-ative Law" 2nd Edn. (1989) p. 396. 
In fact, since Anisminic (supra), it seems likely that all reviewable errors will be 
classified as jurisdictional - see Lord Diplock in O'Reilly v. Mackman, at 1132-3. To that 
extent the Law Commission's concern with this particular problem seems misplaced. 
However, the effects of Anisminic were not appreciated until Re Racal Communications, Ltd 
[1981] AC 374 (sub nom Re A Company, especially per Lord Diplock) and even now cannot 
be stated witii total certainty - see Wade A.L., pp 301f. 
Crown Proceedings Act 1947, s.21(2) as interpreted in Merricks v. Heathcoat-Amory 
[1955] Ch 567. For criticism see Wade (1991) 107 LQR 4; 142 NLJ 1275. Equally whilst 
a declaration of nullity could be obtained against a Ministerial act or decision the courts 
would not make interim declarations. 
It appears that the correct criterion for both die declaration and die injunction was 
special damage - see Barrs v. Bethell [1982] Ch 294 (Warner J, explaining die apparenUy 
more hberal approach in Prescott v. Birmingham Corporation [1955] Ch 310 (CA) as 
inadvertence). In Bradbury v. Enfield LBC [1967] 1 WLR 1311 (CA) the plaintiffs were 
permitted to seek injunctions despite not apparentiy having suffered special damage, alUiough 
die standing issue was not fully addressed. See likewise Legg v. ILEA [1972] 1 WLR 1245. 
In Lee v. Enfield LBC (1967) 66 LGR 195 the court appeared to interpret the special damage 
requirement very liberally. Moreover in A-G ex rel. McWhirter v. Independent Broadcasting 
Authority [1973] QB 629 at 649 Lord Denning MR stated (obiter) tiiat an aggrieved 
individual could seek an injunction in civil proceedings where he had a "sufficient interest" 
in the subject matter of the proceedings. But i f the policy of vesting public rights in the 
The Law Commission intervenes - the "Application for Judicial Review". 
It was to this state of affairs that the Law Commission's recommendations for reform were 
directed. The Commission's principal recommendation was that the declaration and 
injunction should be available with, and as alternatives to, die prerogative remedies under 
an improved procedure to be caUed the Application for Judicial Review (AJR)^^. The 
requirement that an appUcant obtain the leave of the court to make his application was to be 
retained^*; so too the need for an applicant to show a sufficient interest in the subject matter 
Attorney-General can give way to the private interests of the individual who has suffered 
special damage it surely should not where an individual's grievance is no more defined than 
that of the public at large. Certainly where the public right in question is the observance of 
the criminal law special damage is a minimum requirement - and even then the House of 
Lords refused in Gouriet (supra) to give an unqualified assent to that proposition. Indeed 
Lord Diplock (at 502) simply stated that proper plaintiff where public rights were affected 
was the Attomey-General. Lord Wilberforce criticised Lord Denning's remarks at 483. 
Law Comm. No. 73, para 59. The Commission contemplated that an Act of Pariiament 
would be necessary to implement the reforms. However most of tiie changes were 
implemented by the Rule Committee of the Supreme Court, which produced a revised Order 
53 - Uie Order that had previously govemed applications for prerogative relief. Most of die 
reforms are now in substance contained in Supreme Court Act 1981, s.31 which reads as 
foUows: 
(1) An application to the High Court for one or more of the foUowing forms of 
relief, namely-
(a) an order of mandamus, prohibition or certiorari; 
(b) a declaration or injunction under sub-section(2); 
shall be made in accordance with rules of court by a procedure to be known as an 
application for judicial review [AJR]. 
(2) A declaration may be made or an injunction granted under Uiis sub-section in any 
case where an [AJR] seeking that relief has been made and the High Court considers tiiat, 
having regard to -
(a) the nature of the matters in respect of which relief may be granted by 
orders of mandamus, prohibition and certiorari; 
(b) the nature of the persons and bodies against whom reUef may be granted 
by such orders; and 
(c) aU the circumstances of the case, 
it would be just and convenient for the declaration to be made or the injunction granted, as 
tiie case may be. 
For tiie reasons set out at paras 37-39. See now Supreme Court Act 1981 s. 31(3) and 
RSC Order 53 r.3. 
of the application.^' The court was to have power to refuse dilatory applications where the 
delay had effects prejudicial to good administration^" and the inability of the Divisional 
Court to award damages in appropriate circumstances was also corrected.^' 
The reception in the courts. 
However in one sense the most important reform was that express provision was made in 
the new procedure for discovery, cross-examination and otiier interlocutory facilities.^^ For 
it began to look anomalous that litigants should be permitted stiU to evade diose aspects of 
the Judicial Review procedure designed to protect public authorities when there was no 
longer any excuse for doing so. Accordingly public authority protection values came to 
represent the prevailing judicial philosophy^^. 
These values were accommodated in different ways. In Steeples v. Derbyshire CC^ 
Webster J held tiiat tiie effect of Order 53 r.3(5)^^ was to make "sufficient interest" die test 
of standing to seek an injunction even where that remedy was sought in civil proceedings. 
Concerns about protecting public authorities from frivolous or tardy claims were to be 
accommodated in the fact tiiat the injunction was a discretionary remedy and might be 
^' See Supreme Court Act 1981, s.31(3). It appears that this sub-section does not 
faithfully reflect the intentions of the Law Commission. For details see Emery & Smydie, 
op. cit. at p. 275, explaining also how the House of Lords overcame the difficulty in R v. 
IRC ex p. National Federation of Self-Employed and Small Businesses, Ltd. [1982] AC 617. 
^ The Law Commission recommended no fixed time limit for applications. However 
Order 53 r.4 states diat an appUcation must be made prompdy and in any event within three 
montiis, unless the Court considers that tiiere is good reason for an extension. The Supreme 
Court Act 1981 s. 31(6) states that the court may refuse leave or any remedy sought i f there 
has been undue delay in making the application and die granting of a remedy would unfairiy 
prejudice third parties or be detrimental to good administration. However the section is 
without prejudice to Ord. 53 r.4. The resulting problem of interpretation is resolved by the 
House of Lords in Caswell v. Dairy Produce Quota Tribunal [1990] 2 All ER 434. For a 
case where an appUcation though brought within three months was not "prompt" within r.4, 
see R V . Independent Television Commission, ex p. TVNI Ltd (Times 30/12/91). 
^' See now Supreme Court Act 1981, s. 31(4). 
Order 53 r.8. 
see eg Heywood v. Hull Prison Visitors [1980] 1 WLR 1386. 
^ [1985] 1 WLR 256, decided in 1981. 
The predecessor to what is now s.31(3) of die 1981 Act. 
refused in the interests of good administration. However in Barrs v. Bethell^^ Warner J, 
observing that the court's discretion as to remedies did not afford protection as effective as 
the filter of the leave requirement under Order 53, held that only the proof of special damage 
to the plaintiff's interests would justify seeking an injunction in civil proceedings.^' 
In Barrs, Warner J supported his disapproval of Steeples with a reference to Heywood v. 
Board of Visitors of Hull Prison^^. However in that case the plaintiff did appear to have 
suffered special damage, as he did also in Uppal v. Home Office'^, a case where tiie Court 
of Appeal had said (obiter) that "it would be wrong that this procedure [sc. civil action] 
should be adopted in order to by-pass tiie need for getting leave...where what in truth is 
sought is judicial review". So there was authority that even where special damage had been 
suffered, the discretionary nature of the injunction and declaration was considered 
insufficient protection. 
However tiie precise status of the civil alternative in Judicial Review cases remained unclear 
until the decision of the House of Lords in O'Reilly v. Mackman, where the approach in 
Heywood prevailed over tiiat in Barrs"". 
O'Reilly v. Mackman 
Four inmates of HuU prison brought civil actions seeking declarations that disciplinary 
awards made against them by tiie prison board of visitors were invalid for want of 
observance by the board of the rules of natural justice. Leave was not obtained and 
proceedings were initiated after the expiry of the time period applicable to proceedings begun 
by AJR. 
The defendants appUed to Peter Pain J to have the writs and the summons struck out as 
constituting an abuse of the process of the court. They contended that the fact that, as was 
supra, n.26. 
Contrast Peter Pain J in O'Reilly v. Mackman [1982] 3 AU ER 680 at 685. 
Supra n. 33. 
^' Times 21/10/1978. 
"" It seems indisputable that the plaintiffs in O'Reilly had suffered special damage - see 
"Justice - AU Souls: FareweU to PubUc Law?" [1988] PL 495 (C.T. Emery) 
8 
agreed by all sides, judicial review was an appropriate form of proceeding excluded other 
modes of challenge. This submission was not accepted by the judge. One reason why the 
plaintiffs had elected to proceed by action was that they anticipated a substantial dispute as 
to the facts. Whilst Order 53 was now equipped to deal with factual disputes it was clear that 
in practice evidence was nearly always taken on affidavit. To adopt a procedural course in 
which provision was made for the hearing of oral evidence as a matter of course was 
"clearly a rational choice"*' and not one which his Lx)rdship was prepared to characterise 
as an abuse. 
The defendants' appeal to the Court of Appeal was unanimously allowed. Ackner and 
O'Connor LJJ held that the proper remedy to correct an allegedly wrongful determination 
by a board of visitors was certiorari, not declaration and that was enough to dispose of the 
case. However both judges considered that in circumstances where the declaration was 
available to correct ultra vires activity by a public body a complainant was entitled to seek 
that remedy either by appUcation under Order 53 or by ordinary civil action.''^ Lord 
Denning took a more radical view holding that the Application for Judicial Review was to 
be an exclusive procedure in cases such as the present and that it was "an abuse to go back 
to the old machinery instead of using the new streamlined machinery"."^ 
In the House of Lords it was Lord Denning's view which prevailed. Lord Diplock, with 
whom the remainder of their Lordships agreed, began by observing that a prisoner's 
expectation of remission - the denial of which formed the basis of the punishment meted out 
by the visitors - did not give rise to private law rights in the prisoner because it was not 
something which a court would protect against interference by awarding damages. However 
the anticipated reduction in sentence did give rise to a "legitimate expectation" of remission, 
conferring upon an inmate a sufficient interest to argue that its denial in a given case was 
ultra vires the board of visitors.'^ Having thus anchored the dispute firmly in the public law 
arena. Lord Diplock turned to the procedural issue. 
at 688. It seems that Peter Pain J also regarded the claim as one involving a private 
law element on the basis of the decision in De Falco v. Crawley BC [1980] QB 460 (CA), 
disapproved in Cocks v. Thanet DC, discussed infra. 
Stressing again that the declaration was a discretionary remedy - see 700, 702. 
at 659. 
^ at 1126-7. 
His Lordship noted the elements of the new procedure that equipped it to deal with disputes 
of fact and stressed that those elements should come into play whenever the justice of the 
case required it. This, combined with the new provision for discovery, meant that to proceed 
by civil action in a case where no private rights were at issue could only be a "blatant 
attempt[] to avoid the protections for [a respondent authority] which Order 53 provides". Nor 
could this protectionist concern be accommodated in the discretionary nature of the relief 
sought. That course would, given the length of the limitation period in civil proceedings, 
undermine "the need...for speedy certainty" as to the validity of a decision. 
Accordingly in Lord Diplock's view it would "as a general rule be contrary to public policy, 
and as such an abuse of the process of the court, to permit a person seeking to establish that 
a decision of a public authority infringed rights to which he was entitled to protection under 
public law to proceed by way of ordinary action".To this general rule Lord Diplock 
adumbrated two possible exceptions. The first, and less important, was where none of the 
parties objected to proceedings begun by action.*^ The second was where "the invalidity 
of a decision arises as a collateral issue in a claim for infringement of a right of the plaintiff 
arising under private law.'*** Others might be worked out on a case to case basis. 
This process began with their Lordships' next decision. In Cocks v. Thanet DC*^ it was 
held that a housing authority's decision that an applicant for housing did not satisfy die 
relevant statutory criteria"** was challengeable only by AJR. This was so despite the fact that 
a favourable decision gave rise in the applicant to a private law right to accommodation."' 
Cf R V. Durham City Council ex p. Robinson, Times 31/1/92 (Parties cannot create a 
public law jurisdiction) 
at 1134. The meaning of this wiU be discussed infra. 
[1982] 3 AU ER 1135. See also Cato v. Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food 
(CA), Times 9/6/88. 
Contained in the Housing (Homeless Persons) Act 1977. See now Housing Act 1985, 
Part I I I . 
49 For an explanation of the reasoning in this case see chap. 4, n.270. 
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The scope of the O'Reilly rule. 
O'Reilly applies as a "general rule" in "public law" cases. Its application in a particular case 
depends on it being established "(1) that the claims in question could be brought by way of 
judicial review (2) that it [sic] should be brought by way of judicial review".^ It will be 
noted at once that implicit in this test is that some cases can be dealt with by AJR but need 
not be. 
When can a case be brought by AJR? Private law claims. 
Lord Diplock seemed to regard the notion of public law right as coextensive with standing 
to seek one of the prerogative remedies^', which plainly can be obtained only by AJR. 
Public law claims were to be contrasted widi private law cases involving claims to damages 
"as a matter of right".However we have observed'^ that the AJR is adapted to deal with 
some claims to damages and that such claims cannot necessarily be excluded from the 
general rule. On die other hand, it is plain from Order 53 r.9(5) that some damages claims 
are inappropriately pursued by AJR. What distinguishes qualifying from non-qualifying 
damages claims? 
In Davy v. Spelthorne BC^ Lord Wilberforce said "the right to award damages conferred 
by [the Supreme Court Act 1981 s.31(4)] is by its terms linked to an application for judicial 
review...So since no prerogative writ...in relation to the present claim could be sought...no 
consequential claim for damages can be made under [sub-section 4]." It is clear that the Law 
Commission did not intend this provision to alter the substantive law regarding damages 
claims against public authorities^^ and its operation is restricted to cases where an ultra 
^ Per Lord Wilberforce in Davy v. Spelthorne [1984] AC 262 at 277. 
^' O'Reilly, passim. 
^Mbid at 1126. 
Above n. 31. 
^ Above, n. 50 at 277-8. 
Law Comm. No. 73 para 9. Note however the suggestion of Smythe (1988) 138 NLJ 
114. 
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vires decision by a pubhc authority results in interference with an estabhshed private law 
right belonging to an individual.^* 
But whilst claims raising only issues of private law fall outwith the AJR it is not clear that 
all damages claims that contain a public law element lie within it. It has been pointed out^' 
that in these "mixed" public/private cases, considerations of judicial resources and expertise 
might restrict die availability of Order 53 to applicants whose claim raises a complex public 
law point, leaving easier claims to the judges who staff the ordinary civil courts. There are, 
admittedly, dicta to the effect that AJR wil l be available in all "mixed" cases^l However 
Order 53 r.9(5) has been interpreted as allowing a litigant alleging a private law wrong to 
transfer out of the AJR only in a mixed case. Plainly i f all mixed cases were determinable 
on an AJR the purpose to this interpretation would be difficult to discern.^' 
See Lord Diplock in O'Reilly at 1132 (for an example of this type of case see Cooper 
V. Wandsworth Board of Works, discussed below, text following n. 72); R v. Secretary of 
State for the Home Department ex p. Dew [1987] 1 WLR 881 (misuse of process to pursue 
by AJR a claim in negligence raising no public law issue). In fact the Law Commission 
appears to have contemplated that some "purely private" claims could be litigated by AJR, 
eg where a litigant makes an application in error and a full trial is not necessary- see para 
55 of the report. The language of s.31(4) does admit this possibility. On this basis, rule 9(5) 
assists where the AJR is for some procedural reason unable to cope with a private law 
dispute. This is not how the rule has been interpreted - see infra. However some claims that 
might once have been considered purely private are now also justiciable on Judicial Review, 
where they raise issues resolvable by summary proceedings - see chapter 3. To this extent 
the courts have by circuitous means gone some way to implementing die Law Commission's 
intention. 
By C.T. Emery: "Collateral Attack - Attacking Ultra Vires Action Indirecdy In Courts 
and Tribunals" (forthcoming). I am grateful to the author for allowing me access to a draft 
of diis piece. 
Lord Wilberforce in Davy, supra at 278-9; Purchas LJ in R v. East Berkshire Area 
Health Authority ex p. Walsh [1985] 1 QB 152 at 181. 
^' For discussion, see infra. 
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Injunctions and declarations. 
It has been held that an injunction or declaration cannot be granted on an AJR in support 
ofprivate rights only.*" Of course the applicant's lack of private rights does not mean that 
his case wil l be appropriate for an AJR. For it is clear that an individual seeking an 
injunction to enforce the criminal law*' should proceed by action. 
The reason for both of these propositions is that the availability of the injunction and 
declaration on an AJR is, by the terms of s.31(2) of the Supreme Court Act 1981, matched 
*° Law V. National Greyhound Racing Club, Ltd. [1983] 1 WLR 1302 (CA); R v. BBC 
ex p. Lavelle [1983] 1 All ER 241 (Woolf J). Note that the scope of the declaration as a civil 
law remedy is in some doubt. See the discussion in chapter 5. 
This possibility survives according to four of their Lordships in Gouriet v. UPOW, 
supra n. 13. The exception was Lord Diplock. 
13 
either exactly*^ or approximately^Ho the scope of prerogative relief." This scope is 
considered later.*^ 
When should a case be brought by AJR? 
At paragraph 34 of its report, die Law Commission stated that "the new procedure we 
envisage in respect of applications to the Divisional Court should not be exclusive in the 
sense that it would become the only way by which [public law] issues could come before 
the courts."** 
*^  See eg Lord Scarman in the Self-Employed case, supra n. 29 at 647-8. Lord Scamian 
was considering Order 53 r.l(2), the predecessor of s.31(l). Rules of court can change only 
practice and procedure and accordingly to have interpreted r.l(2) as extending die range of 
matters over which the Court could exercise its supervisory jurisdiction would have been to 
condemn the rule as ultra vires. However in Davy v. Spelthorne, supra n. 50, Lord 
Wilberforce approved Lord Scarman's words after the 1981 Act had resolved all doubts 
about the vires of tiie rule. For discussion see Cane "Standing, Legality and Uie Limits of 
Public Law" [1981] PL 322. 
*^ ex p. Lavelle, supra; /^ v. National Greyhound Racing Club, supra; R v. Panel on 
Takeovers and Mergers ex p. Datafin pic [1987] QB 815 at 847-8 per Lloyd LJ. This 
opinion is based on the fact that by die terms of s.31(l) the court is obliged merely to "have 
regard to" the scope of tiie prerogative remedies and in any event can consider "all the 
circumstances of the case". But see n. 56 above. Emery & Smytiie (op. cit. p. 295-6) 
speculate that the inclusion of the injunction and declaration in Order 53 was, like the 
inclusion of the remedy of damages, to give a full range of remedies to applicants bringing 
"mixed" applications. However this does not appear to have been the Law Commission's 
intention - see para 45 of the report, referring to the role of these remedies in Ontario. 
** Note however that whilst a prerogative remedy will be available against a Minister 
purporting to act under statutory powers, an injunction wiU not - even on an AJR 
(Factortame v. Secretary of State for Transport [1989] 2 Al l ER 692. It will be otiierwise 
where tiie injunction is sought in support of rights claimed under Community Law - Same 
V. Same (No.2) [1991] 1 Al l ER 70.). For criticism of tiiis position see Wade (1991) 107 
LQR 4. This creates difficulties in obtaining interim relief against a Minister. For a solution 
see R V. Secretary of State for Education and Science ex p. Avon CC [1991] 1 All ER 282 
(CA); R V. Secretary of State for the Home Department ex p. Muboyayi [1991] 4 All ER 72. 
But see Minister of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Industry v. Vehicles and Supplies Ltd. [1991 ] 
4 AU ER 65 (PC). 
*^  Chapter 3. 
** See also para 58(a). 
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And it is not. For the new procedure does not apparently affect the ability of the Attorney-
General to vindicate public rights by civil action either ex relatione or ex propria motu. A 
similar power is conferred on local authorities by s.222 of the Local Government Act 1972. 
Moreover there have been a number of cases in which both plaintiffs and defendants in 
actions based on private rights have been permitted to raise public law issues necessary to 
the resolution of the private claim.*^ 
But it wiU be apparent from an examination of the background and reasoning of O'Reilly 
that in some cases the AJR must be an exclusive procedure. As Professor Wade has 
observed*^ once Order 53 had been reformed "[h]ow then could it make sense to allow a 
choice of procedures for obtaining the same remedies under which the restrictions of one 
could simply be evaded by recourse to the other?". 
O'Reilly established that the "irresistible" logic*' of this reasoning apphed in general to 
claims made by private actors raising only issues of public law. But i f there was no longer 
any justification for allowing "purely public" claims to be made by action™, other reasons 
have survived the reforms in cases where a public law issue is raised in the context of some 
other dispute. 
Suppose for example that an individual is prosecuted for breaching a local autiiority byelaw 
which he alleges the authority had no power to make''. I f the byelaw were more than three 
months old to apply the O'Reilly rule in these circumstances would effectively deny the 
individual his defence. Or suppose, as in Cooper v. Wandsworth^^, a house owner were to 
*' See chap.2, discussing also cases where public law issues have been permissibly raised 
as a defence to a criminal charge. 
*' A.L. at 677. 
*' Wade "Procedure and Prerogative in Public Law" (1985) 101 LQR 180 at 186-7. 
™ But see chap.5, below. 
' ' For a case law example see R v. Crown Court at Reading, ex p. Hutchinson [1988] 
QB 384. 
(1863) 14 CB(NS) 180. See also Dowty Boulton Paul, Ltd v. Wolverhampton 
Corporation (No2) [1976] Ch 13 (Allegation that public authority in breach of a contract 
made with the plaintiff. Authority's defence was that the breach was authorised by statutory 
powers.) 
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bring an action in trespass against a local audiority which had demolished his house pursuant 
to a demolition order purportedly made under statutory authority. To succeed, the house 
owner would plainly have to establish the invalidity of the order and to require this issue to 
be resolved by AJR would effectively reduce the limitation period applicable to his action 
from six years to three months. 
Of course it may be tiiought tiiat the public authority protection values expressed in O'Reilly 
apply over the private interests of individuals even in these cases. Some judges do take this 
view.^^ Lord Diplock, as we have seen, was inclined to except from the O'Reilly general 
rule public law issues that arose collaterally to a claim in private law. Perhaps because his 
Lordship thought that only a plaintiff could perpetrate an abuse of process '^' he did not 
address the position of a defendant raising a public law issue. However even i f Lord Diplock 
did not intend die rule to apply defendants, he gave no guidance about the meaning of die 
term "collateral" as applied to a plaintiff. 
O'Reilly - defining the problem 
The most obvious difficulty with O'Reilly is tiiat the decision has resulted in a "formulary 
system under which a complainant may lose his case not because it has no merits but simply 
because he has chosen die wrong form of action".'^ This point can perhaps best be 
illustrated by examining the position of a litigant seeking an injunction to restrain die breach 
" Woolf LJ (extra-judicially) "Public Law -Private Law: Why die Divide?" [1986] PL 
220 at 233; Wandsworth LBC v. Winder [1985] 1 AC 461, per Ackner LJ at 470-71. 
See eg Lord Eraser in Winder, supra. In R v. Oxford Crown Court ex p. Smith (Times 
27 December 1989; LEXIS Transcript) Simon Brown J considered diat Lord Diplock would 
have regarded defences not as exceptions to his general rule, but as not widiin its scope. See 
also tiie remarks of Lloyd LJ in R v. Reading Crown Court ex p. Hutchinson [1988] QB 384 
at 392, quoted below, chap. 2 n. 109. 
" Wade op. cit. supra n. 69 at 187-8. 
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by a public authority of a statutory duty, and contrasting it with that of a litigant seeking 
damages.'* 
Legal duties are the product of either the common law or statute. A litigant seeking an 
injunction to enforce a common law duty against a public authority is faced with the problem 
that the remedy he seeks is available under two mutually exclusive procedures, the correct 
choice depending on the characterisation of the duty as public or private. However the very 
fact that the duty in question is owed at common law means that its character will normally 
be apparent. Common law duties are, after all, established by the award of a remedy at the 
conclusion of litigation and (in accordance with the principle ubi remedium, ibi ius) the 
nature of the remedy dictates the nature of the duty. 
Statutory duties, though, owe their existence not to litigation but to legislation. There is no 
remedial touchstone of their character as public or private, which must discerned instead by 
interpretation - a process that has been likened to the tossing of a coin." 
Now, a litigant who has suffered "once and for all loss" and who seeks damages is not, on 
our assumption'^ in a difficult position in point of procedure. For even i f his claim also 
raises a public law issue, he is nonetheless asserting a private law right and can bring a civil 
action. Of course he may lose precisely because the statute creates rights in public law only. 
But this is not an O'Reilly problem, but rather a case where the substantive law does not 
provide a remedy that is of any value.'' However i f a litigant suffers continuing or 
anticipated loss, he wil l wish to seek specific relief in the form of an injunction. Plainly in 
this case a valuable remedy may be lost through choosing the wrong procedure. 
'* We wil l make a preliminary assumption that the effect of Lord Diplock's "collateral 
issue" exception is to permit all damages claims against public authorities to be pursued by 
civil action. 
" By Lord Denning MR in Ex p. Island Records [1978] Ch 122. 
'* Above n. 76. 
" For a case law example see Bourgoin v. Minister of Agriculture [1985] 3 Al l ER 585, 
discussed in chapter 4. 
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Of course it is incorrect to regard established common law duties as being of immutable 
character^ and in any event the foregoing assumes that all damages claims raising public 
law issues can proceed by action. In all probability this assumption does for practical 
purposes represent the law. However due largely to the imprecise meaning of the term 
"collateral" it is not possible to be certain.*' 
The problem compounded - the "obverse" of O'Reilly. 
These difficulties have been exacerbated by a number of cases in which courts have held diat 
a claim brought by AJR should be stiiick out on die grounds diat it disclosed only 
allegations of private law wrongdoing. Occasionally tiiis has been on die basis that the 
respondent is not a public body^; occasionally because the claim relates to an act or 
decision of a body which is admittedly public for some purposes but not for die purposes 
of die claim in question.*^ 
This latter sort of case has tended to arise in the employment context. Sometimes die 
applicant wil l seek certiorari because it is a more valuable remedy in dismissal cases than 
tiiose available at common law or under die employment protection legislation.^ In diese 
cases the applicant's failure is not attributable as much to procedural formalism as it is to 
the fact that die law does not provide a particular kind of remedy in respect of the wrong 
alleged. However where die decision under challenge amounts to less tiian dismissal, it is 
ofi;en a purely procedural difficulty which defeats the application. 
^ See the "Jockey Club" cases, discussed in chapter 3. 
*' See the discussion of Roy v. Kensington FPC in chap. 2. 
eg Law V. National Greyhound Racing Club, supra, n. 60. 
eg R V. East Berkshire Area Health Authority ex p. Walsh [1985] QB 152. 
^ For details see Fredman and Morris (1991) 107 LQR 298 at 299. 
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Making matters worse - ex parte Dew. 
The current procedural position has been rightiy criticised as a "trap for the unwary 
litigant".*' Criticisms of this sort would be to some extent met i f litigants who made Uie 
wrong choice were able to request that their claims be transferred into the correct procedure. 
What facility exists to enable this? 
It is clear that the Court has no power to Q-ansfer into Order 53 proceedings begun by civil 
action**. A measure of relief is provided in the practice of at least one judge of granting 
leave to apply when the action comes before the court and ti-eating the documentation as 
fulfilling the procedural requirements of an AJR.*' 
More complicated is the position of the applicant for judicial review whose claim is in fact 
based in private law. Order 53 Rule 9(5) states: 
Where the relief sought is a declaration, injunction or damages and the Court 
considers that it should not be granted on an application for judicial review but 
might have been granted i f it had been sought in an action begun by writ by the 
applicant at the time of making his application, the Court may, instead of refusing 
the application, order the proceedings to continue as i f they had been begun by 
writ... 
It is clear that this provision wiU avail a litigant only i f he has sought the relief specified in 
the opening words of the sub-rule. In R v. East Berkshire Area Health Authority, ex parte 
Walsh^* the applicant sought certiorari to quash the respondent's decision to dismiss him. 
A declaration in private law being the correct remedy, it was held that Rule 9(5) did not 
*' Forsyth "Beyond O'Reilly v. Mackman: the Foundations and Nature of Procedural 
Exclusivity" [1985] CLJ 415. 
** See Lord Diplock in O'Reilly at 1133. 
*' Woolf LJ, op. cit., at 232. However tiiis would not amount to a ti-ansfer of the action 
and a claimant would presumably lose his costs up to the date on which leave was granted. 
** Above, n. 83. 
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permit an applicant to amend his claim to seek a remedy in private law where he had sought 
in his application a remedy whose availability was confined to public law only. 
A litigant who proceeds by AJR when he should have proceeded by ordinary civil action 
cannot, of course, be accused of an improper attempt to evade the safeguards of Order 53 
for die protection of public authorities. It might be supposed, therefore, diat die Court would 
take a broad view of die scope of Rule 9(5). This has not happened. In O'Reilly, Lord 
Diplock appeared to state that the rule applied where an AJR was made which in fact raised 
no issues of public law.*' However in R v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex 
parte Dew^ McNeill J held that the Court's discretion arose only in cases where "a breach 
of a public law right...has as a consequence an entitiement to damages in private law". This 
"pro-technicality" approach is difficult to support, for it confines the application of die 
provision to cases where it is arguably not needed." Nonetheless, the approach of McNeill 
J has been endorsed by Woolf LJ in R v. Derbyshire County Council, ex parte Noble^. 
Summary of points to be discussed. 
The remainder of this thesis concentrates on some of the issues raised in this introductory 
chapter. We have noted that the scope of the AJR is more or less matched to that of the 
prerogative remedies and in chapter 3 die ambit of die foremost of diese remedies - certiorari 
- is discussed. Obversely we have seen that the "private life" of public bodies is defined by 
reference to the availability of the remedy of damages. It is not possible in work such as this 
to list exhaustively die circumstances in which a public audiority might incur liability in 
damages and in chapter 4 we accordingly confine our inquiry to the most problematic area, 
breach of statutory duty. Chapter 5 addresses some suggestions for reforming procedural 
public law. However we begin in chapter 2 by examining the procedural issue in cases where 
a public law matter has been raised in the context of some other dispute. 
*'at 1133. 
^ [1987] 1 WLR 881 
" Above, n. 58. 
92 [1990] IRLR 332 at para. 29 (not refening explicifly to ex p. Dew). 
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CHAPTER TWO: C O L L A T E R A L C H A L L E N G E 
O'Reilly v. Mackman was a case where the issue that arose related to the prisoners' rights 
in public law only. However, in chapter one we noted two examples of cases where a public 
law issue might arise in the context of some other dispute - typically concerning liability in 
either criminal or private law. In fact it is not uncommon that a defendant (to civil or 
criminal proceedings) or a plaintiff wi l l be required to prove that an authority has acted 
unlawfully in public law in order to make good his defence or his claim.'^ Where a party 
to a legal dispute raises a public law issue not in proceedings, such as AJR'"*, designed 
specially to resolve such issues, but instead in proceedings designed to deal with issues of 
civil or criminal liability and in the context of such an issue he is said classically'^ to 
mount a collateral challenge to die act or decision in question. To what extent are collateral 
challenges permitted in a post-O'Reilly worid? 
Raising a public law issue as a defence to a civil action. 
Lord Diplock did not consider the position of a defendant who seeks to negative liability by 
demonstrating that an authority - which, as we have seen, may or may not be the other party 
to the litigation - has acted unlawfully in public law. The opportunity for the House of Lords 
to address this question in the context of a private law claim arose in Wandsworth LBC v. 
Winder.^ 
Mr Winder had refused to pay a rent increase effected by tiie plaintiff (his landlord). His 
defence to proceedings for possession and arrears was that the increase was in fact ultra vires 
the statutory power under which the Council had purported to act. The county court judge 
struck out the defence on the ground that it was an abuse of process and stayed the 
proceedings to allow the defendant to make an AJR. 
^ Note tiiat the authority need not be a party to die proceedings - Bunbury v. Fuller 
(1853) 156 ER47. 
'" Or statutory appeal procedures. 
'^ Rubinstein, "Jurisdiction and Illegality" (1965), p. 37-8. 
** [1985] 1 AC 461. 
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In the Court of Appeal Ackner LJ resolved the essential policy question oudined above*^  
in favour of the Council.'* However he was in the minority and in the House of Lords it 
was the views of his brethren which prevailed. Lord Fraser expressly adopted an approach 
which balanced "the arguments for protecting public authorities against unmeritorious or 
dilatory challenges to their decisions" against "the arguments for preserving the ordinary 
rights of private citizens to defend themselves against unfounded claims."" It was noted 
that Mr Winder had been refiised leave to make an AJR as out of time. Whilst a denial for 
this reason of the opportunity to challenge die decision of an audiority was acceptable in the 
circumstances of O'Reilly, it was not to be countenanced where, as here, contractual rights 
in private law were involved. 
The reception accorded the decision in Winder has been mixed. Lord Fraser distinguished 
Cocks V. Thanet DC'°° on the ground, inter alia, that in that case "the impugned decision 
of the local authority did not deprive the plaintiff of a pre-existing private law right [but 
instead]...prevented him from establishing a new private law right." Forsyth'"' is 
unpersuaded by this distinction. He argues that "the council's resolution [sc. to increase 
rents], i f valid, extinguished Winder's pre-existing rights; so that even to assert diose rights 
was a challenge to those resolutions". This is, of course, true. But it does not mean diat the 
distinction drawn by Lord Fraser is misconceived. For were the rent increase found upon an 
AJR to be invalid, Mr Winder's contractual rights would be unaffected by it, whereas in 
Cocks even an invalid decision would not have created private rights in the applicant.'"^ 
97 Chapter 1. 
'* See also die views of Woolf LJ in R.v South Somerset DC, ex p. DJB (Group), Ltd. 
(unreported, referred to by Simon Brown J in /? v. 0:)ford Crown Court ex p. Smith, above 
n. 74.) 
" At 509. 
'°° [1982] 3 AUER 1135. 
'*" [1985] CLJ 415 at 430. See also Sir Harry Woolf, extra-judicially, at [1986] PL 220, 
223. 
'°^ It is convenient to deal at diis point witii an apparent misunderstanding on the part 
of some commentators of the effects of Cocks v. Thanet DC. Stanton ("Breach of Stattitory 
Duty in Tort", 1986 at p.79), for example, cites die decision as audiority for die view that 
where a disappointed applicant for housing seeks damages, contending that the audiority's 
refusal to house him is unlawful, he must pursue his damages claim by AJR Power (142 NLJ 
749), on die other hand, states that a damages claim can be pursued by action provided die 
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Moreover i f Forsyth's argument were accepted, the result would ensue that "all private rights 
would...be subject to any de facto assertion of public power unless challenged within three 
months and then only on limited grounds."'"' 
Winder has also been said to represent a departure from tiie philosophy of dieir Lordships 
in Davy v. Spelthorne)'^ At tiiis level the criticism is that the House of Lords is adopting 
an ad hoc, pragmatic approach to the procedural issue when what litigants really need is a 
clear definition of public law for procedural puqjoses.'"' The basis of tiiis view is diat 
Davy is authority for the proposition that wherever a claim raises a vires issue as a "live 
issue"'"* it must be litigated by AJR. However in Davy Lord Fraser said merely that die 
absence of such an issue meant that a claim could certainly proceed by action. He did not 
say that the presence of a live issue required leave to be sought to make an AJR. Indeed 
O'Reilly itself acknowledges that public authority protection values apply unless, in fairness 
to the person affected, they should nor.'"' 
invalidity of the decision has been established on an AJR. However it is clear that the fact 
that an applicant must challenge the decision means tiiat damages are not available - see An 
BordBainne Co-op v. Irish Dairy Board [1984] 2 CMLR 584 at 588 per Sir John Donaldson 
MR (sed quaere i f the decision is reached negligentiy - see below). Cocks as tiius explained 
does not undermine the view that all damages claims against public authorities can be made 
by civil action. 
'"' Beatson (1987) 103 LQR 34 at 60. 
'"* [1984] AC 266. 
105 Beatson, op. ciL at 57f. 
'"* As it would do wherever an order was made which would have the effect in law of 
nullifying an act or decision of an authority. This would include a successful collateral 
challenge. By contrast a dispute would not raise a live issue where the effect of any order 
made might in practice cause an authority to depart from its decision. Davy is a case of the 
latter sort for reasons explained below at n. 130. For criticism of the artificiality of die 
distinction see Forsyth op. cit. n. 101 at 429; Craig "Administi-ative Law" 2nd Edn. at p. 
423. 
'"' At 1131. It is therefore inaccurate, as Power does (op. cit. supra) to describe these 
cases as a "retreat" from O'Reilly. 
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Ultra vires as a defence to a criminal charge. 
In distinguishing O'Reilly in Winder Lord Fraser referred expressly only to defences based 
on private law rights. It might be supposed from the tenor of his Lordship's judgment'"* 
that his approach would apply a fortiori where a defendant to a criminal charge raised by 
way of defence an allegation that a public authority had acted unlawfully in public law. 
However in Quietlynn, Ltd v. Plymouth City COM/ICI/"" Webster J regarded die distinction 
as significant. 
Quietiyim, Ltd had applied to the Council under the Local Government (Miscellaneous 
Provisions) Act 1982 for a licence to operate a sex shop. The company considered die 
refusal of the application to be invalid and, accordingly, it resolved to carry on operating die 
shops without a licence. When prosecuted in die magisti-ates' court, the company raised the 
defence that paragraph 28 of Schedule 3 to the Act permitted trade pending die resolution 
of a licence application. Here no valid determination had taken place and dierefore no 
offence had been committed. 
The conclusion of the Crown Court, on appeal from the magistrates, that the justices had no 
power to entertain the company's defence, was upheld by die Divisional Court. Lay justices 
were not to be expected to exercise a judicial review jurisdiction in these cases, and the 
appropriate course was for proceedings in the magistrates' court to be adjourned to enable 
an AJR to be made. 
However in R v. Reading Crown Court ex parte Hutchinson™, which concerned die 
byelaw example given above, diis approach was doubted. Lloyd LJ said diat it was fanciful 
to characterise as an abuse of process "a case where the plaintiff [sic] is not complaining of 
anything but is defending himself against a criminal charge". The decision in Winder, 
thought his Lordship, was not limited to private law claims. That did not mean diat it would 
never be an abuse of process to raise a vires issue by way of defence to a criminal charge. 
Indeed the facts of Quietlynn itself provided an example. For the company had in fact first 
'"* especially die penultimate paragraph. 
[1988] QB 114 at 130. 
"° [1988] QB 384 at 392. 
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applied for Judicial Review, abandoning its application at the door of the court.'" In any 
event Lloyd LJ would have held that Quietlynn did not apply to byelaw cases. 
The limits of the "vires defence". 
In Hutchinson Lloyd LJ would have permitted a public law decision to be challenged by way 
of defence wherever it was "an essential element in the proof of the [wrong] alleged"."^ 
However a decision to initiate civil or criminal proceedings does not fall into such a 
category"^ - for in such a case the consequences of a successful challenge "would simply 
be to prevent the [authority] taking proceedings to establish a liability which the defendant 
has no ground to deny.""" Accordingly the criticisms made in Hutchinson of Quietlynn 
stand up only because of the provision contained in Schedule 3, para 28 of the 1982 Act. 
Without that section the company would have had no defence to the charge of trading 
without a licence."^ 
Raising a vires issue as plaintiff. 
We have already noted that Lord Diplock suggested tiiat public law issues arising collaterally 
to a private law claim might be excepted from his general rule. But another ground on which 
Lord Fraser in Winder was able to distinguish O'Reilly was that in the latter case "tiie 
prisoners had initiated the proceedings...while in the present case the respondent is the 
This suggested rationalisation was adopted by Simon Brown J in /? v. Oxford Crown 
Court (supra), who considered that the general approach in Hutchinson represented the 
correct position. 
"^ At 395. 
See Waverley BC v. Hilden [1988] 1 WLR 246; approved Avon CC v. Buscott [1988] 
2 WLR 788 (CA). See also die remarks of Simon Brown J in Oxford Crown Court ex p 
Smith, supra. 
"' C.T. Emery "The Vires Defence" [1992] CLJ 308 at 329. 
"^  This is well expressed by Rubinstein (op. cit) at 37: "A refusal to grant a licence is 
a negative act which is reviewable only in direct proceedings. In criminal proceedings against 
a person operating without a licence, it is of no avail to argue tiiat tiie auUiority's refusal to 
grant a licence was invalid; even if true, that in itself does not create the necessary licence 
and does not negative the offence." Professor Wade appears to overlook the significance of 
para28atA.L. p.333 n.l5. 
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defendant....He did not select the procedure to be adopted." Plainly, then, the decision in 
Winder could not be taken necessarily to apply to a case where a plaintiff sought to raise a 
public law issue in support of a private law claim, and for a time there was uncertainty."* 
This uncertainty has been substantially reduced - though not eradicated - by two recent 
decisions"^ in which plaintiffs have been permitted to mount collateral challenges to public 
law issues. To understand the first of these decisions requires us to digress into a brief 
account of the circumstances in which a public authority might attract liability in negligence 
for the careless discharge of its statutory functions. 
Impermissible negligence claims 
As a matter of substantive law it will in fact be very difficult to establish that an authority 
is liable in negligence in respect of statutory functions. If a decision in relation to such a 
function can be classified as a "policy" decision no liability can attach. Anns v. Merto/j"* 
involved a claim that a local authority had been negligent in failing to deploy its powers of 
building inspection so as to prevent damage to the plaintiff's flat caused by its being built 
on inadequate foundations. It was held that, if that failure was traceable to a discretionary 
decision about how many inspectors to recruit or how often inspections were to be made, 
Contrast Shears Court, Ltd. v. Essex CC (1986) 85 LGR 479 with Guevara v. 
Hounslow LBC Times 17th April 1987, criticised by Wade A.L. at p 684. In the Court of 
Appeal in Winder Goff and Parker LJJ (482b, 491b-d) regarded the arguments for admitting 
the vires defence as applying equally to a claim based on private rights. Cf Doyle v. 
Northumbria Probation Service [1991] 4 All ER (Authority's defence to claim in contract 
that it had acted ultra vires in making the contract can be contested in civil proceedings. 
Plaintiff was not challenging but relying upon the correctness of the authority's action.). 
Lonrho pic v. Tebbit [1991] 4 All ER 973; Roy v. Kensington and Chelsea and 
Westminster Family Practitioner Committee [1992] 1 All ER 705. 
[1978] AC 728. See also Home Office v. Dorset Yacht [1970] AC 1004. 
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tills was a policy matter for the authority'" and - apparentiy'^ - could not be made die 
subject of a neghgence claim. 
Permissible negligence claims 
However it may be suggested that decisions about whether an individual satisfies the criteria 
of entiflement to a benefit - as in Cocks v. Thanet^^^ - are relevantiy different from policy 
decisions of the Anns kind. In Rowling v. Takaro Properties'^ the Privy Council refiised 
to rule out the possibility that a negligence claim could be maintained by an individual 
against a public authority which had acted ultra vires in denying him a benefit'^ ^ 
How should a complainant proceed in such a case? In Lonrho pic v. Tebbit^'^ it was held 
that where an individual was required to prove ultra vires as part of a negligence claim 
against a public authority he could rsisc the vires issue in proceedings begun by writ. 
However Lonrho did not involve a decision to withhold a benefit in the ordinary sense of 
"Public authorities have to strike a balance between claims of efficiency and thrift" 
per du Parcq LJ in Kent v. East Suffolk Rivers Catchment Board [1940] 1 KB 319, 338. 
'^ Anns is in fact ambiguous on whether a policy decision can ever form the basis of 
a negligence suit. However the Privy Council in Rowling v. Takaro Properties said that such 
decisions are not justiciable by a court - see [1988] AC 473 at 501, citing Craig, 
Administrative Law (see now 2nd edition at 449-58). For a fuller discussion see Craig (1978) 
94 LQR 428. "[I]t is weU established that in cases where the exercise of a statutory 
discretion involves flie weighing of competing public interests , particularly financial or 
economic interests, no private law duty of care arises because tiie matter is not justiciable 
by tiie courts" per Browne-Wilkinson V-C in Lonrho pic v. Tebbit [1991] 4 AU ER 973 at 
981. 
'^ ' Above n. 100. 
'^ Above n. 120. 
'^ ^ In that case the benefit denied was a necessary Ministerial consent to a sale of shares, 
consent being granted or withheld according to a statutory scheme. However a number of 
arguments against possible negligence hability were advanced. For example the fear of 
liability might lead to "defensive" administrative practices causing delay in decision-making; 
that the availability of judicial review afforded an adequate remedy; that ordinarily the effect 
of an ultra vires decision which is reversed on a reconsideration of the matter is merely to 
"postpone the receipt by the plaintiff of a benefit which he had no absolute right to receive" 
(see 502-3). 
'^ Supra n. 117. Since this section was written tiie Court of Appeal has upheld tiie views 
of tiie Vice-Chancellor (Times 5/6/92). 
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that phrase and a closer examination of the judgment suggests that it may be of only limited 
assistance in cases of that type. 
The facts of Lonrho were these. The plaintiff company contended in an ordinary civil action 
that Norman Tebbit, as Secretary of State for Trade and Industry, and the DTI had failed in 
breach of a duty of care promptly to release it from an undertaking not to purchase more 
than a certain percentage of shares in House of Eraser. The undertaking had been obtained 
by the defendants acting under statute following a report by the Monopolies and Mergers 
Commission in 1981 that a merger between the plaintiffs and House of Eraser might be 
expected to operate against the public interest. A further report in 1985 had reached a 
different conclusion, whereupon the defendants had come under a duty to release the 
undertaking'". As a result of the delay in discharging this duty the plaintiffs had lost their 
opportunity to make a bid for Eraser's. 
The defendants applied to have the action struck out on two grounds. Eirst they argued that 
the facts disclosed no reasonable cause of action - the decision to delay was a policy 
decision to which no duty of care could attach'^ *. Browne-Wilkinson V-C did not agree. 
In Anns v. Merton idiom the timing of the release was arguably an "operational" matter - ie 
one involving the carrying out of a policy decision. Such a decision was in theory 
This was the view of Browne-Wilkinson V-C at 98 le. Counsel for the defendants 
submitted that the only duty was to consider whether to discharge the plaintiff from its 
undertaking. The distinction was not material because, in the words of the judge, "the 
relevant question in this case is not whether the undertaking should have been released (it 
was) but whether it should have been released earlier" (ibid). 
The defendants claimed that the reasons for the delay were a) that they had been 
advised to postpone the release of the undertaking until the announcement of the decision 
whether to refer rival bid for Eraser's to the MMC and b) that they had been advised first 
to hear representations from the board of Eraser's. 
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susceptible to a negligence action'^ ^ provided the plaintiff could prove that it had been 
reached ultra vires'^ *. 
Secondly the defendants claimed an abuse of the process of the court - in as much as a vires 
question formed part of the plaintiff's claim that question could be properly raised only by 
Application for Judicial Review (AJR). Browne-Wilkinson V-C disagreed. In his Lordship's 
opinion the need to prove ultra vires was not "purely collateral" to the negligence claim 
although it was "only one ingredient" in the plaintiff's cause of action.'^ ' 
However in deciding the abuse of process point, the Vice-Chancellor was influenced by a 
number of factors which might be taken to limit the scope of his conclusion'^. Eirst, his 
Lordship admitted to difficulty in understanding why a plaintiff needed to establish at all that 
the defendant's decision was ultra vires in these cases. That the requirement should operate 
'^ •' In Rowling (supra n. 120) at 501 it was observed that, whilst negligence actions are 
excluded in respect of policy decisions, to classify a decision as operational does not 
necessarily mean that a duty of care will exist. Eor example the loss suffered by the plaintiff 
could be economic. Moreover as Bowman and Bailey ([1984] PL 277) point out in Anns the 
plaintiff was alleging an omission by the council to prevent loss whose immediate author 
was some other agency. In Murphy v. Brentwood D C [1991] 1 AC 398 Lords Mackay (at 
451) and Keith (at 463) left open the question of whether the council would have been liable 
had the plaintiff in Anns suffered physical loss. 
128 see eg Dorset Yacht (supra n. 118) at 1031, 1067-8. 
'^ ' "The essence of the claim is for breach of a private law right, ie a claim in 
negligence." per Brovme-Wilkinson V-C at 987f. Why was the vires issue not "purely 
collateral"? Mr John Laws, for the defendant, distinguished between collateral vires issues 
and those that were "essential" to a private law claim. Here, in order to succeed, Lonrho 
were "bound to allege that the defendants' actions were ultra vires" and the vires point was 
therefore essential. However it is more usual to describe a collateral challenge as involving 
the raising of a vires point in proceedings designed to settle some other issue eg the civil or 
criminal liability of one of the parties. On this view Lonrho were plainly mounting a 
collateral challenge. The definition of collateral challenge advanced by Mr Laws is difficult 
to support, for it implies that Lord Diplock in O'Reilly contemplated the raising in private 
law proceedings of inessential vires points. 
'^ ° Browne-Wilkinson V-C also relied on Davy v. Spelthorne DC [1984] AC 262 as 
establishing that the rule in O'Reilly did not in general extend to cases where claims in 
negligence were brought in the ordinary courts "even though those claims collaterally raise 
questions as to the validity of acts done by public authorities". In fact Davy did not involve 
a challenge to a public law decision. The whole essence of the plaintiff's claim was that the 
negligence of the authority had deprived him of his chance to question the validity of the 
enforcement notice made against his property. 
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effectively to lock out Lonrho from its damages claim, it being long out of time to make an 
AJR, was scarcely a conclusion which, in tiie light of that difficulty, his Lordship was likely 
to reach. 
It is, with respect, easy to sympathise witti the Vice-Chancellor on tiiis first point'^ '. 
Permissible negligence claims related, in his Lordship's definition, to the execution of 
decisions. A number of cases have indicated that at this level the legality or otherwise of 
public authority activity is to be measured in private law only'^ .^ However, claims that an 
authority has acted negligentiy in deciding not to confer a benefit plainly must involve 
establishing tiiat the decision under challenge was ulti^ a vires - for otherwise the authority 
has not acted unlawfully. There is some indication in Browne-Wilkinson V-C's judgment 
that his Lordship thought such decisions were inappropriately the subject of negligence 
claims'^ .^ But important for our purposes is that Lonrho is not necessarily authority for the 
view tiiat an apphcant for a benefit who alleges tiiat die refusal of his application is botii 
ultra vires and negligent can raise tiie vires issue in civil proceedings. 
Secondly his Lordship was influenced by the fact that Lonrho's claim, if successful, would 
not have any "general retrospective effect on the public administration - a factor of great 
importance in requiring that public law matters should in general be ventilated by way of the 
speedy process of judicial review". The implication of this remark is that where a collateral 
challenge was made which did have tiiis effect, a litigant might have to proceed by AJR. 
This limitation does not, however, feature in the second of the two recent cases on the scope 
of collateral attack, namely Roy v. Kensington and Chelsea and Westminster Family 
Practitioner Committee"^. 
The facts were as follows. The plaintiff was a GP listed witii tiie defendant Committee as 
undertaking to provide general medical services in its area. The Committee was under a 
'^ ' see eg Beatson and Mattiiews Administrative Law, Cases and Materials 2nd Edn 
(1989) pp 579-80. 
'^^ Cocks V. Thanet DC (supra), Cato v. MAFF (Times 9/6/88), R v. Panel on Takeovers 
and Mergers, ex parte Al Fayed Times April 15tii 1992. 
'^ ' [1991] 4 All ER at 982. 
'^ [1992] 1 All ER 705 (HL) 
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statutory duty to pay the full basic practice allowance to a GP on its list if, inter alia, "he 
[was] in the opinion of the...Committee devoting a substantial amount of time to general 
practice under the National Health Service". In October 1984, the Committee reduced the 
plaintiffs basic practice allowance by twenty per cent, effective from the following January, 
on the ground that his frequent absences from his practice meant that he no longer fulfilled 
this statutory criterion. The plaintiff began proceedings by writ, alleging that in acting in this 
fashion the Committee was in breach of the contract which it had made with him when it 
included him on the area list. The Committee argued that in challenging its decision the 
plaintiff was raising a public law issue which could in the circumstances be litigated only 
by AJR and applied to have the action struck out. The judge granted the application and was 
overturned by the Court of Appeal. The Committee appealed to the House of Lords. 
Their Lordships dismissed the appeal. In their unanimous opinion Dr Roy was asserting a 
private law right and tiiough he was required to raise a vires issue in litigation to vindicate 
that right he could do so in proceedings begim by ordinary civil action. However their 
Lordship's reasoning is at best difficult to understand. 
The first question for the House was whence derived the plaintiffs private law rights. The 
Court of Appeal had found that the act of listing amounted to the formation of a contract 
between the plaintiff and tiie Committee. Indeed Nourse LJ'^^ considered that the 
Committee's duty to form an opinion on what was a "substantial amount of time" was a 
contractual one and no issue of public law arose. The House of Lords was less sure that a 
contract existed'^ *. However, this was not decisive against Dr Roy. Lord Lowry was clear 
tiiat the statute gave rise to a "bundle of rights which should be regarded as [the Plaintiffs] 
individual private law rights against tiie Committee...including the very important private law 
right to be paid for the work tiiat he has done".'" However the mere fact that private law 
rights were capable of flowing from the statute was not of itself sufficient to enable a claim 
quoted in the judgment of Lord Lowry at 727. Sed quaere whether this approach to 
the incorporation of statutory powers into public autiiority conti-acts is consistent with that 
of Sir John Donaldson MR in R v. East Berkshire Area Health Authority ex parte Walsh 
[1985] QB 152 at 165. 
'^ * 709c-d per Lord Bridge, 725c-g per Lord Lowry. 
'" 725h 
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to those rights to be made in proceedings begun by writ. For as Lord Bridge 
acknowledged'^ *, "tiie doctor's entitiement to the full rate of basic practice allowance [was] 
conditional on the opinion of the...Committee that he [was] devoting 'a substantial amount 
of time' to his national health service practice" - it was "made to depend on [the 
Committee's] discretionary judgment". In that respect tiie plaintiffs claim bore a striking 
resemblance to the challenge to the authority's decision in Cocks v. Thanet DC. Lord Lowry 
was able to distinguish Cocks on tiie basis that tiie inclusion of tiie Plaintiff's name on tiie 
Committee's list gave him a private law right not to payment but to a fair and correct 
consideration of his claim for payment. In contrast the claim in Cocks was brought by 
someone who was "simply a homeless member of tiie pubUc" and not in any pre-existing 
formal relationship with the housing authority'^ '. Lord Lowry was plainly influenced by 
tiie fact tiiat a strong Court of Appeal had found there to be a contract by virtue of tiie listing 
and tiiat tiie listing itself tiierefore had the appearance of an act conferring private rights of 
some kind. By this means his Lordship was able to hold witiiout embarrassment that "the 
existence of any dispute about entitlement means that [the Plaintiff] will be alleging a breach 
of his private law rights through a failure by the Committee to perform its public duty"'*". 
Lord Bridge was elliptical in his speech. Satisfied tiiat the essential principle embodied in 
Cocks should be maintained, his Lordship nonetheless appeared to lay down a general 
principle that "the circumstance that the existence and extent of the private right asserted 
may incidentally involve the examination of a public law issue cannot prevent the litigant 
from seeking to establish his right by action commenced by writ or originating 
summons""*'. 
'^ « 709a-c 
'^ ' 728e-f 
'^ 726d-e. Emphasis added. 
708a. Emphasis added. In fact Lord Bridge begins this sentence with the words "But 
where a litigant asserts his entitiement to a subsisting right in public law...". But how can 
a right be subsisting when the public law decision on which its vesting depends has gone 
against an individual and its invalidity is not yet clear? One possibility might be that the 
right vests in individuals the moment tiie statute in question is passed and tiie authority 
merely performs a mechanical role in identifying those individuals. However this argument 
would seem to apply witii equal force to enable a Cocks complainant to challenge a housing 
decision by ordinary action, and therefore cannot explain the statement of Lord Bridge in 
Roy. 
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On the facts of the case, Lord Bridge too appeared to regard the inclusion of the Plaintiff 
on the list as an act constitutive of private rights. Again the likeness to a contractual 
relationship formed the basis of this view. However with respect it might be wondered 
whether the existence of "contractual echoes" in the relationship between an authority and 
an individual provides a sufficientiy precise basis for distinguishing Cocks. Moreover if the 
Plaintiffs right to have his claim properly considered is a private right, what basis is there 
for the view of their Lordships that Dr Roy was alleging pubhc law illegality on the part of 
the Committee?'^ ^ 
Plaintiffs and public law issues. 
However the greatest difficulty with Roy is the equivocality with which their Lordships 
endorsed the mode of proceeding adopted. Eor even assuming Roy to be reconcilable with 
Cocks, it is not clear that every plaintiff asserting that an exercise of public law power had 
interfered with his private law rights would be permitted to proceed as Dr Roy did. Their 
Lordships approved the statement of Robert Goff LJ in Winder^*^ that the considerations 
enabling a defendant to a private law action to raise public law matters in those proceedings 
as part of his defence should in principle also apply to plaintiffs raising vires issues. 
However it was unnecessary to go so far in the instant case. Lord Lowry said that what was 
important was not merely that Dr Roy^s private law rights were involved, but that those 
rights "dominated the proceedings"'''^ . 
This was because his Lordship was content to adopt what counsel for Dr Roy referred to as 
the "narrow approach" to the application of the O'Reilly rule. This approach permitted to be 
brought by civil action cases raising public law issues necessary to the resolution of a private 
law claim only where the pubhc law matter was somehow less prominent than the private 
element. By contrast, counsel's broad approach permitted all necessary pubhc law issues to 
'"^  Cf the approach of Nourse LJ in the Court of Appeal, supra. It may be that the duty 
to form an opinion is a duty owed in both public and private law. Cocks v. Thanet DC 
(supra) would appear to indicate that a single statutory duty will be either public or private -
not both. Is this "dichotomy" between public and private law to be reassessed in the light 
of Roy! 
'"^  supra n. 116. See also An Bord Bainne Co-op, Ltd v. Milk Marketing Board [1984] 
2 CMLR 584 at 588, per Sir John Donaldson MR. 
'^ 729c 
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be raised in a civil action. This distinction reflects ambivalence surrounding the meaning of 
the term "collateral" for the purposes of Lord Diplock's collateral challenge exception in 
O'Reilly.'*^ 
There are, not surprisingly, problems in adopting such an imprecise test. Firstiy it would 
leave in place the "procedural minefield""** which the straightforward adoption of Robert 
Goff LJ's dictum would have done much to remove. Secondly, though it is arguably 
acceptable tiiat the vulnerability of private rights to the running of time should depend on 
whetiier or not the defendant is a public authority"*^ , surely the narrow approach goes too 
far. For it would appear to give the court an enormous discretion to deny private rights in 
a given case using flie pretext that the public law issue was more central than its private 
coimterpart. Nor is it clear that a collateral challenge permissibly made by writ can 
alternatively be made by AJR"** - so to proceed by application is not necessarily to play 
safe. 
A third difficulty arises from tiie fact that Lord Lowry advanced a number of reasons why 
Dr Roy was entifled to proceed by action, even on the narrow approach. For example, the 
order sought by Dr Roy, for the payment of money due, could not be granted on Judicial 
Review; the type of claim at issue - although not this particular claim - might involve a 
dispute of facL'"" However it is not clear whether these reasons stand independentiy of the 
fact that Dr Roy's private rights dominated the proceedings, nor whether, witiiout those 
reasons, that fact would be sufficient. 
Indeed the relevance of a dispute of fact to the procedural question is not clear. Lord Lowry 
said that the presence of such a dispute "must constitute an important qualification of the 
'"•^  Compare witii the definition advanced above (n. 95) that supplied by Lord Fraser in 
Wandsworth v. Winder (supra n. 96) at 508. 
'"* 729a 
'"^  As it would do if plaintiffs claiming an ultra vires interference witii their private 
rights were required to proceed under Order 53. This concern weighed witii the Court of 
Appeal in Winder (supra n. 96). On tiie question whetiier a special procedure is needed even 
for private law claims against pubUc authorities see Beatson op. cit. above n. 103 at p 44. 
"** Chapter 1 n. 57. See also Lord Lowry at 726b. 
at 729. 
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general theory propounded by Lord Diplock in O'Reilly v. Mackman"^^. It is unclear 
whether his Lordship intended this remark to distinguish between types of cases involving 
both public and private law or whether any public law matter that raised a dispute of fact 
was appropriately litigated by ordinary civil action. Can the latter interpretation be reconciled 
with tiie O'Reilly general rule? It would seem not, for tiie facts were an issue in O'Reilly 
itself. Lord Lowry was influenced in his view of the relevance of facts by a statement of 
Woolf L J made in the context of separating out those orthodoxly private claims which were 
nonetheless apt to be dealt with by AJR. This plainly cannot apply to allow purely public 
law claims out of Order 53.'^ ' Moreover Woolf LJ has a number of times made clear that 
he favours a strict apphcation of the O'Reilly rule.'^ ^ He is unlikely therefore to have 
intended his statement to constitute a potentially broad exception to it. 
Nevertheless Lord Lowry did indicate his preference for the broad approach'^ ^ and stated 
moreover that "when individual rights are claimed, there should not be a need for leave or 
a special time limit" as there would be if an individual was required to proceed under Order 
53. This, combined with the conclusion that where possible a court "ought to let a case be 
heard rather than entertain a debate concerning the form of the proceedings"'**, reflects 
a great desire to mitigate the effects on litigants of procedural rigidity in pubUc law cases. 
And this is as it should be. However their Lordships' decision does allow for the possibility 
that complex public law cases, best heard by the judges who take Crown Office business, 
should be litigated by AJR despite the presence of a private law element to the claim. Lord 
Lowry declined to adopt the broad approach because the pwint had not been fully argued 
before the House and had been "seriously discussed only by the academic writers". It seems 
tiiat for sufferers from the O'Reilly headache, relief may yet be some way off. 
'^ ° 723f, 726d-e, 729c 
'*' See chapter 3, below n. 243. 
'^ ^ See eg [1986] PL 220,233; [1992] PL 221; "The Protection of tiie Pubhc: The New 
Challenge" (1990, Hamlyn Lectures) p 24ff. 
728-9. 
'^ 730. We might note also the lengths to which tiieir Lordships were prepared to go to 
distinguish Cocks v. Thanet. 
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CHAPTER T H R E E : T H E SCOPE OF T H E APPLICATION FOR JUDICIAL 
R E V I E W 
In O'Reilly v. Mackman Lord Diplock regarded Order 53 as adapted to deal with challenges 
to the "lawfulness of a determination of a statutory tribunal or any otiier body of persons 
having legal autiiority to determine questions affecting the common law or statutory rights 
or obligations of other persons as individuals."'^ ^ In so doing his Lordship echoed the 
much-cited description of the scope of certiorari suppHed by Atkin LJ in R v. Electricity 
Commissioners, ex parte London Electricity Joint Committee Co.(1920), Ltd.'^^ Such 
authority - or de lure power - comes principally from one of two sources - contract or 
statute. "Outside the regular courts of this country, no set of men can sit in judgment on their 
fellows except so far as Pariiament authorises it or tiie parties agree to it."'" Altiiough 
Lord Diplock's words are apt to embrace contractual jurisdictions, it was clear at the time 
of O'Reilly, and is acknowledged elsewhere in his Lordship's judgment, that contractual 
powers are not reviewable.'^ * Accordingly, certiorari is orthodoxly a remedy to control 
decisions made under statutory autiiority. 
"Affecting legal rights". 
It is not proposed here to list the various ways in which legal rights can be affected by the 
exercise of a statutory jurisdiction'^' and we may confine ourselves to some particular 
observations. 
'^ ^ [1982] 3 All ER at 1129. 
'^ * [1924] 1 KB 171 at 205. 
'" Per Denning LJ in Lee v. The Showmen's Guild of Great Britain [1952] 2 QB 329 
at 341. A third source is the Royal Prerogative (whence indeed derives the power of the 
ordinary courts). Prerogative power, except when exercised by a superior court, is clearly 
reviewable in principle {Council of Civil Service Unions v. Minister for the Civil Service 
[1984] 3 AU ER 935) but is statistically not important and is not considered here. For 
discussion see C. Walker "Review of the Prerogative: The Remaining Issues" [1987] PL 62. 
'^ * See R V. National Joint Council for the Craft of Dental Technicians (Disputes 
Committee) ex p. Neate [1953] 1 QB 704; R v. Criminal Injuries Compensation Board ex 
p. Lain [1967] 2 QB 864 at 882 per Lord Parker CJ. 
'^ ' See De Smifli J.R.A.A. chapter 8. 
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Eirst it is clear that for certiorari to issue, the jurisdiction in question need not have a 
potentially negative or "subtracting" effect on legal rights.'*" The reason appears to be this. 
It seems now settied'*' that where an authority is empowered to award a statutory money 
benefit to individuals who satisfy certain criteria, a decision that the individual does so 
qualify for the benefit confers upon him an entitiement to it in private law. Thus the 
authority enjoys a capacity to create private rights by decision which tiie private individual 
enjoys only through the machinery of contract or covenant. Judicial Review has traditionally 
been concerned with the "special" aspects of the legal personality of pubhc bodies'*^  and 
the cases are tiierefore consistent with tiiis view.'*^ 
Certiorari and licensing decisions. 
However it is doubtful whetiier a decision to confer other types of statutory benefit - such 
as regulatory licences and other permissions - will constitute private rights in the 
apphcant.'** Nonetheless such decisions are plainly subject to certiorari'* .^ The reason 
is that to engage in a regulated activity without a licence is invariably to court the 
appUcation of sanctions which do affect legal rights - typically criminal penalties. In such 
cases, there will be no option in law but to comply with the jurisdiction of the hcensing 
authority. 
'*° See tiie cases cited in De Smitii at p.389, nn.67,8. 
'*' Cato V. MAFF (Times 9/6/88); Cocks v. Thanet [1982] 3 AU ER 1135. Cf R v. 
Secretary of State for Transport ex p. Sherriff and Sons, discussed below chap 5 n. 298. 
'*^ Davy V. Spelthorne DC [1984] AC 262; R v. East Berks AHA ex p Walsh [1985] QB 
152. 
'*^  With one celebrated exception - R v. Criminal Injuries Compensation Board ex p. 
Lain [1967] 2 QB 864. The Board is a non-statutory body charged with tiie disbursement of 
compensation to the victims of violent crime. A decision to pay compensation to an applicant 
does not give the him a right to sue for the money in the event of it being in fact withheld. 
Accordingly the decision does not "affect legal rights" in the sense discussed. This was 
acknowledged by Lord Parker CJ and Ashwortii J, who did not regard the matter as 
problematic. Diplock L J attempted to fit the decision into the "legal rights" formulation - but 
unconvincingly, see Wade AL at p. 642 n.65. 
164 See chapter 5. 
'*^  See eg R v. Gaming Board for Great Britain ex p. Benaim and Khaida [1970] 2 QB 
417; R V. Huntingdon DC ex p. Cowan [1984] 1 WLR 501. 
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Indeed Hcensing decisions fall within a wider principle, expressed by Professor Wade'** 
that certiorari will lie "where there is some prehminary decision, as opposed to a mere 
recommendation, which is a prescribed step in a statutory process which leads to a decision 
affecting rights, even though the preliminary decision does not immediately affect rights 
itself." It seems that tiie preliminary decision must be binding on the later decision-maker 
(unless it can be shown to be ultra vires) or sometiiing of which he is legally required to take 
account.'*^ 
Ex parte Datafin 168 
The position just described has been radically altered by the decision of the Court of Appeal 
in R V. Panel on Take-overs and Mergers ex parte Datqfin pic which, in essence, extends 
the scope of certiorari'*' to jurisdictions with which an individual or firm wishing to 
engage in a particular activity has no option in fact but to comply.'™ Datcfin was a case 
in which the applicant company was aggrieved by a decision of tiie Panel that N pic, 
Datafin's rival in a battie to take over M pic, had not, as Datafin had alleged, breached the 
City Code on Take-overs and Mergers. Datafin did not stand in a contractual relationship 
with the Panel and its difficulty in obtaining a public law remedy was that the Panel lacks 
the legal power to enforce its findings. 
'** A.L. p. 638. See also Diplock L J in tiie Lain case, above n. 163 at 884-5. 
'*'' Compare with the cases cited by Wade A.L. at 638 tiie decision in R v. St. 
Lawrence's Hospital Visitors ex p. Pritchard [1953] 1 WLR 1158. 
'** [1987] QB 815. 
'*' Though it was a declaration that was actually awarded for reasons of convenience -
see Donaldson MR at 842. 
'™ Except, it appears, where tiie individual is forced to bind himself by contract to tiie 
jurisdiction in question, see infra. 
Note: it is possible to detect a movement away from the requirement that an 
instioiment has legal effect in Gillick v. West Norfolk and Wisbech AHA [1986] AC 112. See 
Wade (1986) 102 LQR 173. Donaldson MR acknowledges tiiis in Datafin at 838. 
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Nonetiieless, a breach of tiie Code is a factor to which tiie Stock Exchange accords "great 
importance"'^ ' in the exercise of its statutory power to list and delist a company for tiie 
purposes of dealings in its shares. And whilst it is implicit in tiiis tiiat the Stock Exchange 
is not legally bound by a determination of the Panel" ,^ in practice the Stock Exchange is 
faithful to Panel decisions - even to the point at which Nicholls LJ was able to regard the 
Panel as acting as a delegate of the Stock Exchange for these purposes.'^ ^ This fact 
enabled the Court of Appeal unanimously to hold that a decision of the Panel was 
reviewable. The resulting effect on the scope of certiorari was described by Sir John 
Donaldson MR: 
"Possibly the only [elements essential to ground the jurisdiction to award certiorari] 
are what can be described as a public element, which can take many different forms, 
and the exclusion from the jurisdiction of bodies whose sole source of power is a 
consensual submission to its jurisdiction."'^'' 
The hmitation that certiorari is concerned with the exercise of statutory or prerogative 
powers only is thus abandoned. 
Limiting review - the "implied devolution of power". 
But it is mistaken to assume on the basis of Datafin that all bodies exercising a de facto 
jurisdiction are amenable to certiorari. The fact that decisions of the Panel have "indirect" 
legal effect through the powers of the Stock Exchange is one limitation. Another is tiiat 
evidence from tiie Department of Trade and Industry'^ * showed, in effect, tiiat tiie 
Government would have established the Panel by Act of Partiament had it not already 
Nicholls LJ at 851. A breach of the Code so found by the Panel will be ipso facto 
an act of misconduct for the purposes of the exercise by the Stock Exchange of its 
contractual powers over its members. 
'^ ^ It follows that a decision of the Panel does not faU within tiie orthodox scope of 
certiorari as "a prescribed step in a statutory process". Contra Forsyth [1987] PL 356 at 361. 
Cf R V. Kidderminster District Valuer ex p. Powell (Times 23/7/91). 
At 852. 
At 838. 
'^ ^ Details of which appear at 835. 
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existed in effective form. Thus, in tiie words of Lloyd LJ'^*, there had been an "implied 
devolution of power" from government to tiie Panel akin to the way in which the Criminal 
Injuries Compensation Board, an admittedly reviewable body'", had been constituted. To 
tills extent tiie source of a body's power remains relevant. 
Contractual jurisdictions 
Can we detect any further limitations? It might be supposed, for example, tiiat tiie Court of 
Appeal in Datafin intended to leave unaltered tiie rule tiiat certiorari will not lie at tiie 
instance of an individual whose relationship with the respondent authority is purely 
contractual'^'. But even if this were tiie case, a significant number of previously domestic 
bodies might find themselves properly the subject of an AJR in respect of at least some of 
their decisions. Take, for example, the National Greyhound Racing Qub. The Qub is a non-
statutory body responsible for overseeing the conduct of greyhound racing in the UK. It 
discharges this regulatory fimction through the award of Ucences to, amongst others, trainers 
who agree to abide by the rules promulgated by the Qub from time to time. The Club has 
no strict legal power to do this, in as much as it is not unlawful to train greyhounds witiiout 
a hcence. However tiie near monopoly control enjoyed by the Club over greyhound racing 
means that in practice it will be impossible for an unlicensed trainer to gain access to 
"official" race meetings. In Law v. National Greyhound Racing Club, Ltd.'^ it was held 
"* At 849. 
'" See ex p. Lain (above). 
See for example R v. Advertising Standards Authority Ltd ex p. The Insurance Service 
pic (Times 14/7/1989); R v. Chief Rabbi ex p. Wachman (Times 7/2/91); R v. Football 
Association ex p Football League Ltd (Times 22/8/91); R v. The Imam of Bury Park, Luton 
ex p. Sulaiman All and 304 others (Independent 13/10/91). These tests have been criticised 
as uncertain by Popplewell J in R v. Code of Practice Committee of the British 
Pharmaceutical Industry ex p. Professional Counselling Aids Ltd (Times 7/11/90). Compare 
the criteria applied by the Court of Justice of the European Communities in deciding what 
is an organ of tiie State for tiie purposes of the rules governing tiie direct effect of directives: 
Foster v. British Gas pic [1990] 3 All ER 897 (CJEC); [1991] 2 AU ER 705 (HL); Doughty 
V. Rolls Roycepic (Times 14/1/92). Note tiiat merely because a body is in principle amenable 
to judicial review does not mean it wiU be so in respect of all its decisions - see below n. 
190. 
'^ ' But see infra. 
'*° [1983] 1 WLR 1302. 
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that certiorari would not lie to quash a decision to suspend an existing licence on the basis 
that the licence holder was in a contractual relationship with the Qub. But what of the 
applicant for a licence? The power enjoyed by the Club over the livelihood of such an 
individual is not derived from contract - nor indeed any legal source. It is purely de facto 
power and it is arguable therefore that, like the power of the Takeover Panel, it should be 
amenable to judicial review under Order 53.'*' 
The contract exclusion undermined. 
But i f this were to be so, might it not appear anomalous i f those in an existing contractual 
relationship were "confined to an action begun by writ, while the applicant [could] obtain 
the same or possibly more extensive relief through the remedy of Judicial Review"?'^ 
Obversely it appears that a challenge to revoke an existing statutory licence can be made 
only once the procedural hurdles of Order 53 have been surmounted. It might appear strange 
at least that, in a case where de facto power has been harnessed where otherwise legislation 
would have been deployed'*^, these requirements can be evaded merely because the 
relationship between the applicant and the authority is nominally consensual. 
In Datafin, Lloyd LJ appeared to exclude from the newly extended ambit of Judicial Review 
at least challenges of the kind mounted in Law^^. Donaldson MR, on the other hand, 
excluded only bodies whose jurisdiction was exclusively consensuaF^. The language is 
important because it is, of course, quite possible to enter into a contract simply because one 
has in practice no option but to do so. A strict reading of the judgment of Donaldson MR 
'*' It seems that even in the absence of a contract a declaration in private law 
proceedings wil l lie in such circumstances. But the grounds on which it will issue afford 
litae real protection to an applicant (Mclnnes v. Onslow-Fane [1978] 1 WLR 1520). Contrast 
the protection afforded by the rules of natural justice to the applicant for a statutory licence, 
discussed by Wade AL at 559. On Mclnnes, see the remarks of the Divisional Court in ex 
p. RAM Racecourses, discussed below. 
Per Stuart-Smith LJ in RAM Racecourses summarising the respondents' argument. See 
also Craig at p.421; Forsyth [1987] PL 356 at 365; Pannick [1992] PL 1 at 4. 
'^ ^ Above. 
' ^ At 847, approving ex p Neate (supra) - a revocation case. 
'*^  At 838. See also the language of Nicholls LJ. 
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may therefore admit a challenge under Order 53 to a decision to revoke an existing 
contractual licence. 
This possibility has been discussed in three recent cases in which challenges have been made 
to decisions of the Jockey Club'**. In each case the possibility has been denied given the 
current state of the authorities, but in all there are indications of judicial unease with the 
orthodox position. 
The Jockey Club Cases. 
The Jockey Club is now incorporated by Royal Charter made under the prerogative altiiough 
it does not itself exercise prerogative powers'*^ The existence of the Charter is nonetheless 
considered to indicate governmental recognition of the important position of the Qub, "a 
position which could as well have been enshrined in legislation".'** In law the Qub 
occupies a position with regard to those involved in horse racing that is for present purposes 
identical to that of the Greyhound Racing Club. 
The most comprehensive analysis of the amenability of the Club to the prerogative orders 
is found in the second of the diree cases with which we are concerned, ex parte RAM 
Racecourses. The gravamen of the dispute in that case concerned a decision by the Club not 
to allocate "official" fixtures to the applicants' racecourse contrary to the applicants' alleged 
legitimate expectation. As Simon Brown J observed, such an expectation would be material 
only i f in deciding the question of allocation the Club were performing a public law duty. 
However in Massingberd-Mundy it had been held by a Divisional Court comprising Neill LJ 
and Roch J that the Club was not a body susceptible to Judicial Review under Order 53. 
Neill LJ had regarded himself as bound so to hold by Law's case, for although in Law the 
applicant was in a contractual relationship with the Club, unlike Mr. Massingberd-Mundy, 
'** Re Massingberd-Mundy (Times 3/1/90, LEXIS Transcript); R v. Jockey Club ex p. 
RAM Racecourses (Times 6/4/90, LEXIS Transcript); R v. Disciplinary Committee of the 
Jockey Club ex p. HH the Aga Khan Independent 29/7/91, LEXIS Transcript). See Grayson 
(1991) 141 NLJ 1113. 
This appears to be the consensus of the judges who decided the applications, sed 
contra Roch J in Massingberd-Mundy. 
'** Per Simon Brown J in RAM Racecourses. 
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the Court of Appeal had not limited its decision by reference to this fact. Roch J did not 
appear to regard Law as applying necessarily to cases where there was no existing 
contractual relationship, but held that it did conclude the matter of Mr. Massingberd-Mundy's 
application. This apparent inconsistency on the part of Roch J is apparently to be explained 
in that his Lordship was in reality identifying the desirable, rather than the actual, limits of 
Low.'*' In RAM, Stuart-Smith LJ took a sceptical view of Roch J's judgment and followed 
Neill LJ. However his Lordship expressed dissatisfaction with Law to the extent that it did 
appear to extend to cases where, as in the instant case, no contract existed between applicant 
and authority"". 
Simon Brown J (obiter) was more radical still. His Lordship considered that the Court in 
Massingberd-Mundy should have distinguished Law on the ground of the existence of a 
contract. Moreover he also made it clear that in the light of Datafin it would still have been 
open to a court to entertain an application under Order 53 even in the circumstances of 
Law's case. 
This with respect is surely an accurate statement of the law. According to its pre-Datafln 
definition, power was either unique to public authorities (ie essentially statutory) and 
reviewable, or shared with private actors (ie essentially contractual) and challengeable by 
way of civil proceedings for a declaration and/or injunction. However the exercise of de 
facto power is not the exclusive preserve of statutory bodies and criteria additional to "legal 
uniqueness" must now also be considered when attempting to distinguish public and private 
for procedural/ remedial purposes. Simon Brown J offered a guide based upon whether the 
respondent authority was exercising a quintessentially governmental function. The Jockey 
Club's function of allocating fixtures to racecourses was "strikingly akin to a statutory 
licensing function". Obversely the employment and commercial decisions of admittedly 
189 This is the explanation advanced by Woolf LJ in ex p. HH the Aga Khan. 
"° It is not to be assumed that Stuart-Smith LJ would have wished to see the ambit of 
the prerogative remedies extended to all decisions of the Jockey Club made in the absence 
of a contract. His unease was confined to the decision in the instant case. We may speculate 
that, like Simon Brown J, his Lordship would have approved of the actual decision in 
Massingberd-Mundy that a decision concerning who may sit as the Chairman of a local 
Stewards' Panel was one lacking any significant public dimension. 
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public bodies lay outwith the scope of certiorari because of their kinship to the activities of 
private institutions.'" 
Nevertheless even Simon Brown J would have followed Massingberd had the outcome of 
the case depended upon it"^ and the judgments in the Jockey Qub cases therefore all 
reaffirm the view that where an authority's sole source of de iure power is contract even its 
exercise of purely de facto power (ie in application cases) is unreviewable. Datafin 
accordingly is confined to bodies exercising no de iure power whatever and it is premature 
to conclude, as Pannick does, that the only issue is whether the authority has "such a de 
facto monopoly over an important area of public life that an individual has no effective 
choice but to comply with [its] rules''."^ 
Should Law be departed from? 
The issue addressed in RAM is unlikely to go away. Were the Court of Appeal to consider 
the matter it would not of course have to follow Massingberd. But what considerations might 
influence the Court in choosing between applying Law and pursuing the Datafin logic? 
Surely the first consideration must be whether Order 53 would be the exclusive avenue of 
redress in these cases. There are policy arguments to suggest that it should."* However 
Simon Brown J in RAM, addressing the apparent anomaly that the applicant for a contractual 
hcence might obtain superior remedies to those available in revocation cases, suggested that 
in such cases certiorari would be available as an alternative to a declaration in civil 
proceedings. 
This raises the related question of whether Order 53 is actually needed to control the 
activities of the Jockey Qub and similar bodies. For it is clear that even in "refusal" cases 
' " His Lordship illustrates this with R v. BBC ex p. Lavelle [1983] 1 WLR 23 - however 
the BBC is not a public body on the orthodox definition. 
The application failed on grounds unconnected with the jurisdictional issue. 
Op. cit. p3. CfR V. Corporation of Lloyds ex p. Briggs (Times 30/7/92) 
'*• Above. See also Beloff [1989] PL 95 at 108 speculating whether the AJR might 
become "the appropriate, and hence, the necessary procedure". 
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the Court has the jurisdiction to award a declaration in civil proceedings that an applicant 
has been treated unfairly."^ There is no danger here, unlike in Datofin (where no private 
law remedy was available); of the courts "allowing their vision to be clouded by the 
subtlety...of the way in which [executive power] can be exerted""*. Nonetheless, as already 
pointed, out the protection afforded at the level of substantive principle in refusal cases is 
meagre in comparison to applications for statutory licences. Might it be that the inclusion 
of the Jockey Qub within the ambit of certiorari will enhance that protection? Certainly the 
status of the applicants' legitimate expectation \nRAM was said to turn on this consideration. 
However it would be unfortunate i f Clubs and Associations were to find themselves required 
to afford an applicant a ful l , oral hearing (with the possibility of legal representation) before 
refusing him a licence, witiiout the countervailing protection of the O'Reilly rule. A possible 
solution to this conundrum is hinted at by Stuart-Smith LJ and Simon Brown J in RAM, both 
of whom considered that had Mclnnes v. Onslow-Fane been decided after Datcfin it would 
have found its "natural home" in Order 53 "rather than" civil proceedings. This still leaves 
a difference in revocation cases between decisions concerning, on the one hand, statutory 
and, on die other, contractual licences despite the fact that the protection afforded an 
individual at the level of substantive principle is very similar in each case. It is submitted 
tiiat the answer to this problem is not to force the Law plaintiff into Order 53 but rather to 
recognise that there is a difference between the refusal and the revocation of a licence 
whatever the source of tiie decision-maker's authority, and to allow a choice of procedure 
in all revocation cases. 
Matching the issue to the procedure - the summary character of Order 53 proceedings. 
Nothing in RAM Racecourses detracts from the view that the reviewability of a non-statutory 
body depends upon evidence of governmental recognition of its "public" character. Moreover 
the case emphasises that only the "governmental" decisions of such bodies will be 
reviewable. 
However in a number of recent cases it has been held that pubhc authority decisions in the 
realm of employment might be challengeable under Order 53 despite the fact that in RAM 
Mclnnes v. Onslow-Fane, above. 
' ^ Per Donaldson MR in Datafin at 838-9. 
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both judges considered that such decisions were essentially domestic. In these cases it is 
possible to detect an approach which brings within the scope of Order 53 matters governed 
by private law prior to Datctfin but which are nevertheless suitable to be dealt with in 
summary proceedings. However to understand these cases it is necessary to examine the pre-
Datqfin position regarding amenability to certiorari of the employment decisions of public 
authorities. 
Public authority employments and public law. 
This position has been worked out in a number of cases in which public authority employees 
have sought to challenge disciplinary decisions made by their employers. In essence where 
such a decision - to dismiss or suspend etc - is taken pursuant to a statutory power conferred 
on the authority, certiorari wi l l lie to quash it. Where, on the other hand, the power to 
discipline is derived from the contract of employment the employee must investigate other 
avenues of redress."' 
The problems of applying this test surfaced before the current pre-occupation with the 
public/private divide"* but arose in a most acute form in a post-O'Reilly case, R v. East 
Berkshire Area Health Authority ex parte Walsh.^^ Walsh was a senior nursing officer 
who had been dismissed from his employment with the respondent authority on disciplinary 
grounds. He alleged that in so acting the authority had breached the procedures applicable 
in such cases which were contained in his contract of employment. However his application 
for certiorari^"" was supporied on the ground that statute required his contract to include 
terms, including those at issue, negotiated by the Whitley Council for the Health Service and 
approved by the Secretary of State. 
197 ie remedies at common law or under the employment protection legislation. 
"* R V. Post Office ex p. Byrne [1975] ICR 221 (Disciplinary procedures negotiated by 
the Post Office with Trade Unions pursuant to a statutory injunction held not to be 
enforceable by prerogative order as derived from the applicant's contract of employment) 
199 [1985] QB 152. 
^ "The applicant did not claim damages, no doubt because he or his advisers took the 
view that the quashing of the dismissal would leave his contract of employment intact and 
entitie him to full pay unless and until there was a further and valid dismissal" per Sir John 
Donaldson MR at 160. 
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The Court of Appeal did not regard this as sufficient to inject a public law element into Mr 
Walsh's claim. According to Donaldson MR claims of the present type could be divided into 
three categories. He said (at p. 165): 
"Parliament can underpin the position of public authority employees by directiy 
restricting the freedom of the public authority to dismiss, thus giving the employee 
public law rights and at least making him a potential candidate for administrative 
law remedies. Altematively it can require the authority to contract with its 
employees on specified terms with a view to the employee acquiring private law 
rights under the terms of the contract of employment. I f the authority fails or refuses 
thus to create private law rights for the employee, the employee will have public law 
rights to compel compliance...If, however, the authority gives the employee the 
required contractual protection, a breach of that contract is not a matter of public law 
and gives rise to no administrative law remedies." 
Walsh's claim fell clearly into the last of these categories and was to be struck out.™' 
Bemadette Walsh has criticised the decision in ex parte Walsh on the ground that, despite 
clear authorit/"^ that some statutory underpinning of an employment is necessary for 
public law remedies to be available, there is no authority that the required underpinning 
disappears once statutory procedures have been incorporated into a contract™^. The actual 
decision can therefore be supported only on the "somewhat contrived" ground that in 
instructing the authority to incorporate, Pariiament has indicated its intention that matters be 
governed by private law only^**. 
^ ' The court also rejected the argument tiiat a public law element could be derived either 
from tiie fact that the public had an interest in the employment affairs of a great public 
service or from Walsh's seniority within the service. Moreover the general employment 
protection legislation was not considered a sufficient statutory underpinning for Oiese 
purposes - see chap. 4 ("Statutory duties and public authority defendants"). 
Ridge V. Baldwin [1964] AC 40; Malloch v . Aberdeen Corporation [1971] 2 AU ER 
1278. 
203 [1989] PL 131 at 141. 
^ Ibid at 143. For other criticisms of the decision see Fredman and Morris (1991) 107 
LQR at 303. 
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Walsh's second observation on the test propounded by the Master of the Rolls is more 
important still. We have already observed that ex parte Walsh is notable for having 
established the "obverse" of the rule laid down in O'Reilly viz. that purely private claims 
cannot be pursued by AJR. Yet there remains one outstanding area of uncertainty. "One 
inteipretation of the judgment suggests that the Court of Appeal intended to exclude from 
judicial review only cases in which there were no statutory restrictions upon dismissal and 
cases in which the authority was actually directed by statute to contract with its employees 
on specified terms. Altematively, did it intend the exclusion to cover all cases in which 
statutory restrictions have been expressly or impliedly incorporated, even in the absence of 
a specific statutory requirement that they should be so incorporated?"^"' In a regime of 
procedural rigidity such uncertainty is unfortunate. 
Reviewing employment decisions in the absence of a statutory underpinning. 
What can nevertheless be said with certainty on the basis of the foregoing is that the exercise 
of a "free-standing" statutory power to discipline can be supervised by a prerogative 
order.^ "* However it seems now clear that the absence of such a power is not fatal to a 
claim made under Order 53. 
This possibility arose in R v. Civil Service Appeal Board ex parte Bruce?^ There the 
Divisional Court held that tiie CSAB, although not a statutory body, was in principle 
amenable to Judicial Review largely because the applicant was not apparenfly engaged under 
a contract of service with the Crown and could not enforce the limits of the Board's 
jurisdiction in private law proceedings. However May LJ thought that even where a civil 
B. Walsh, op cit. at 143. In support of die first view she cites R v . Birmingham CC, 
ex p. Gollam (LEXIS Transcript); in support of the second R v. Home Secretary ex parte 
Benwell [1985] QB 554. For the resolution of a further potential uncertainty about what 
constitutes a "statutory underpinning" see the discussion of ex p Noble, infra. 
^ R V. Home Secretary ex p. Benwell (supra);/? v . Home Secretary ex p. Attard (LEXIS 
Transcript). 
[1988] ICR 649 (Divisional Court; relief refused in discretion); approved [1989] ICR 
171 (CA). The Court of Appeal did not comment on the dictum of May LJ referred to infra. 
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servant was engaged under contract^* the circumstances of his dismissal and any appeal 
to the Board might still be susceptible to Judicial Review under Order 53. 
This dictum has been interpreted by Fredman and Morris^"' as a reference to the 
statute/contract divide propounded in ex parte Walsh, adapted to fit cases where the exercise 
of prerogative powers affects contractual rights. Recentiy, however, another possibility has 
emerged in a number of cases in which, paralleling the dicta in RAM Racecourses^'", the 
courts, whilst affirming the sufficiency of a statutory undeipinning, have indicated their 
preparedness to review contractual disputes in the absence of either prerogative or statutory 
powers. 
Publicness related to the substance of an employment decision. 
The first of these cases is R v. Derbyshire County Council ex parte Noble^"^^ Noble was 
a police surgeon whose services had been dispensed witii by tiie respondent Council in 
circumstances revealing an alleged breach of the rules of natural justice. He sought certiorari 
to quash the Council's decision and mandamus to require it to reinstate him. A Divisional 
Court had struck out the application, applying ex parte Walsh. However in the Court of 
Appeal coimsel for Dr Noble argued that a public law element was supplied by the fact that 
Dr Noble was employed pursuant to the Council's duty under the PoUce Act 1964, s.l to 
provide an adequate and efficient police force for its area. Woolf LJ emphatically rejected 
this contention. In his Lordship's opinion a statutory underpirming would be present in these 
cases only where it regulated the very decision under challenge. In this case there was no 
provision governing dismissal.^'^ 
™* A possibility which did not appear to his Lordship to be unconstitutional, should the 
Crown display the intention to create legal relations lacking at tiie time the applicant was 
engaged. 
^ [1988] PL at 74. See also Arrowsmitii (1990) 106 LQR 277 at 285. For an alternative 
interpretation see B. Walsh, op cit at 149. 
Supra. 
^" [1990] IRLR 332. Noted by Carty (1991) 54 MLR 129. 
'^^  Paras. 11, 17. See also McCowan LJ at para 32. Woolf LJ stated tiiat tiie presence 
of a statutory provision "may" entitie an employee to Judicial Review (para 11). This may 
be taken to be a reference to the fact that where such a provision is incorporated into a 
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With respect this view is surely correct - for otherwise Mr Walsh would have succeeded in 
his application. However it wil l not always be irrelevant that an employee is the instrument 
whereby a public authority discharges its public law duties. Woolf LJ quoted with 
approval^'^ a passage from the judgment of Purchas LJ in Walsh indicating that where the 
termination of an individual's contract owed to a breach by the authority of a public law 
duty Judicial Review would be available. Of course a duty such as that in the Police Act 
1964 s.l - as with most duties of this nature -is highly open-ended and therefore seldom 
clearly breached^'^ However in rare cases Order 53 may be an appropriate route.^'^ 
In any event Woolf LJ acknowledged that it was possible for a contractual dispute to be 
suffused with a public element irrespective of any statute. This would be the case where the 
"subject-matter of the dispute [indicates that] Judicial Review is appropriate", as it would do 
where it applied broadly to all the employees of an authority^'* or where the decision was 
taken in the interests of the public.^'^ By contrast the decision in Dr Noble's case 
concerned the way "he and he alone had been treated".^'* 
contract the rule in Walsh wil l apply, 
at para 16. 
^'See Cane [1981] PL 11. 
'^^  For an example see R v. Liverpool City Council ex p. Ferguson and Grantham (Times 
20/11/85), discussed by B. Walsh op. cit. p. 145. Additionally, even if no breach can be 
proved, a contract may be a consideration which an authority must take into account in 
deciding how to fu l f i l a duty - R v. Hillingdon Health Authority ex p. Goodwin [1984] ICR 
800 (judicial review of dismissal permitted). 
eg Council of Civil Service Unions v. Minister for the Civil Service (die "GCHQ" 
case) [1984] 3 Al l ER 935. 
'^^  See R V. Harrow LBC ex p. D [1989] 2 WLR 1239 (decision to place applicant on 
register of suspected child abusers held reviewable even though it did not alter the pre-
Datafin "affecting legal rights" test). See also R v. Norfolk CC ex p. M [1989] QB 619; R 
V. Lewisham LBC ex p. P [1991] Al l ER 529. 
^'* Para 28. Applying the "interests of the public" criterion we might ask why Dr Noble's 
dismissal was not a matter of public law - whilst s.l of the 1964 Act might be an insufficient 
underpirming for the purposes of tiie Walsh test, yet does it not indicate that the public had 
an interest in the employment of Dr Noble? Contrast Dillon LJ at para 40 and also 
Donaldson MR in ex p. Walsh at 164. 
50 
Woolf LJ's attempts to blur the contract/statute divide in the employment context continued 
in McLaren v. Home OfficS-^"^, heard immediately after Noble's case by the same panel of 
judges. The issue here was whether a prison officer at Wandsworth Prison had an arguable 
case that a working agreement of which the prison Governor was allegedly in breach had 
been incorporated into a contract of employment between the officer and the Home Office. 
The officer's action for a declaration had been struck out by tiie judge who considered tiiat 
his rights, i f any, were in public law only and tiiat AJR was the correct way to proceed. 
Dillon LJ considered that the plaintiff did have an arguable case that his private law rights 
had been infringed^, and Woolf LJ took the opportunity to lay down (obiter) guidance 
for future cases. 
Essentially tiiese cases were to be divided into the following categories 221 
(i) In relation to "personal" claims against his employer a public authority employee 
should pursue any cause of action that he may have by ordinary civil action. 
Proceeding by AJR would be appropriate only where an employee's private law 
claim was "subsidiary to" a public law matter.^ ^^ 
(ii) Where "an employee of tiie Crown or otiier public body is adversely affected by 
a decision of general application, but he contends that that decision is flawed on... 
Wednesbury grounds, he can be entiUed to challenge that decision by way of judicial 
review."^" 
[1990] IRLR 338. 
^° For the reasons set out at paras 18-20. 
^ '^ see paras 38-42. 
^ Paras 38, 42. See tgexp . Ferguson and Grantham (supra). 
"GCHQ" supra. This appears to be the case irrespective of any statutory underpinning 
{ex p. Noble, supra, paras 18f, passim.) 
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(iii) Disciplinary decisions of bodies established under statute or the prerogative, to 
which the employer or the employee is entitied or required to refer disputes affecting 
their relationship, are challengeable by way of AJR.^ 
(iv) Disciplinary decisions which are by contrast purely domestic can be challenged 
only by civil action. 
About this analysis we can make a number of points. First, although Woolf LJ was clear that 
McLaren's claim fell within the first category, it is not apparent why the case was "entirely 
unsuited" to judicial review as falling within category (ii) .^" This is not to say that die 
result of the case would have been different i f Mr McLaren's claim had been so classified -
for it seems that AJR wil l be an appropriate rather than an exclusive mode of proceeding 
in these cases.^ * However we may wonder about the outcome had Mr McLaren proceeded 
by AJR. 
Secondly whilst the quasi-judicial characteristic of disciplinary proceedings might point to 
their amenability to Judicial Review some proceedings can be challenged only by civil 
action. In any event private employers too exercise disciplinary functions. In delineating the 
scope of Order 53 Woolf LJ expressly referred only to the disciplinary decisions of bodies 
set up under statute or the prerogative, although it is clear that disciplinary decisions of the 
public authority employer itself can be reviewable.^^' To this extent a statutory 
underpinning remains sufficient to bring a case witiiin Order 53, irrespective of whether the 
authority is acting in a fashion akin to private institutions. 
224 See ex p. Attard; ex p. Bruce; ex p. Benwell (supra). 
^ I have adopted a different numbering system from that of Woolf LJ for ease of 
narrative exposition. 
"* Woolf LJ's language throughout is permissive. 
ie where there is a sufficient statutory underpinning within the meaning assigned to 
tiiat expression in ex p. Walsh. Woolf LJ implicitiy accepted die comectness of diis 
proposition in ex p. Noble, supra, passim. 
52 
Third whilst it is plain that "an attack on a collective decision of a public body... is of a 
different sort to an attack on an individualised decision it is not the case that private 
employers never make decisions affecting their workforce as a whole. Accordingly to allow 
Judicial Review of an employment decision on the ground of the breadth of its impact is not 
the same as allowing Review because of its "governmental" nature.^' 
The place of Judicial Review in the realm of public authority employment arose again in R 
V. Lord Chancellor's Department ex parte Nangle^^. That case concemed a challenge to 
a disciplinary decision of the respondent Department on the grounds of an alleged breach of 
the rules of natural justice.^^' It was conceded by the applicant that were he engaged under 
a contract of employment it was inappropriate for him to proceed by AJR. However he 
contended that as a Civil Servant he did not have a contract 
The Divisional Court held tiiat Mr Nangle had indeed a contract and tiie respondent's 
decision was not therefore amenable to Judicial Review. I f their Lordships were wrong about 
that then the decision in any event lacked any significant public element. 
The conclusion that the presence of a contract ousts Judicial Review is difficult to support 
in the light of the above discussion, as is the statement tiiat "in the absence of a... contract 
the applicant is clearly in a stronger position [to contend tiiat his claim falls within Order 
53]".^^^ The presence or absence of a contract is irrelevant i f tiie claim involves a public 
element - as their Lordships appear to admit later in their judgment."' Why tiien did Mr 
Nangle's claim involve no public element? 
228 Carty (1991) 54 MLR at 131. 
^' RAM Racecourses, supra. This is not, of course to suggest tiiat tiie poHcy decisions 
of private employers wil l be amenable to certiorari - tiiese tests simply maiic tiie boundary 
between the public and private lives of public bodies. 
230 [1991] IRLR 343. 
" ' Nangle had not been dismissed and tiierefore had no right of appeal to tiie Civil 




First their Lordships made it clear that the absence of a remedy in private law did not 
necessarily mean that Mr Nangle would have a remedy in public law. Counsel for Mr Nangle 
had submitted that the matter fell within the third of Woolf LJ's four categories listed above. 
This was because the authority of the CSAB - which Woolf LJ expressly included within the 
ambit of Order 53 - was derived form the Civil Service Pay and Conditions Code, which 
also contained the internal departmental disciphnary procedures at issue in die present case. 
However their Lordships identified an "essential difference" between the decision of a body 
whose jurisdiction had to be invoked by way of appeal and the decision of an employer with 
whom the applicant was in a direct relationship.^^ Decisions of the latter kind were 
"internal" and were such as might arise in the case of any large employer. Additionally a 
decision of a public authority employer might be amenable to certiorari where it raised 
"questions of policy or interpretation of legal powers which will be justiciable in Judicial 
Review".^^' Mr Nangle's claim was both internal and individualised and had no public 
element. 
Conclusion on contract and the private lives of public bodies 
The tests deployed to distinguish between the public and private lives of public bodies in the 
contractual sphere are both mutually inconsistent and of uncertain application.^^* In RAM 
Racecourses, Simon Brown J would have restricted review to cases where contractual powers 
were used in support of a "governmental" ftmction - in that case, regulation. There is, of 
course, imprecision in this term - more so in other, different, tests, such as whether the claim 
involves challenging a policy decision of general application or a decision made in the public 
interest. Admittedly there is no indication in any of the cases that AJR will be an exclusive 
mode of proceeding in these circumstances. To that extent it will always be open to an 
employee to avoid uncertainty and begin proceedings by writ. However the advantages of 
A distinction which held irrespective of whether the Pay and Conditions Code had 
contractual force (para 45). 
para 42. 
"* See Art'owsmith (1990) 106 LQR 277. 
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proceeding by AJR"' wi l l continue to attract employees into Order 53. Here uncertainty 
is critical - the "obverse" of the O'Reilly rule"* together with the restrictive interpretation 
of rule 9(5), in substance confirmed in Noble, will conspire to cost litigants time and money 
in instituting fresh proceedings i f they guess incorrectiy. In the circumstances the way 
forward must be to overturn the celebration of legal technicality that is the decision in ex 
parte Dew^^^, and allow easy transfer out of Order 53. 
Nevertheless there is much in these cases from which to take encouragement. It is surely 
correct that the Courts should not regard themselves as confined by the historical definition 
of public law for the purposes of allowing litigants in to Order 53. As Woolf LJ pointed out 
in Noble there is no question of an O'Reilly-type abuse of process here and the substance 
and background to a particular decision can tiierefore be considered.^ 
Arrowsmith^' has argued that tiie special position of tiie State is "background" enough for 
these purposes. However the summary character of Order 53 proceedings would presumably 
place restrictions on the amenability of contractual decisions to Judicial Review even in such 
a regime. In Noble, Woolf LJ was influenced by tiie fact that tiie claim in tiiat case involved 
a conflict of evidence with which the AJR procedure was not ordinarily adapted to deal.^^ 
See Fredman and Morris, op cit above n. 204 at 299. Also B. Walsh, op cit n. 203 
at 132f. 
"* See the discussion of ex parte Walsh in chap. 1. 
"' R V. Secretary of State for the Home Department ex p. Dew [1987] 1 WLR 881. 
^ It has been pointed out by commentators that one factor influencing the result in the 
employment cases has been tiie availability to the applicant of remedies under the 
employment protection legislation (see B. Walsh, op cit. at 146; Fredman and Morris, op cit 
n. 204 at 308. However this consideration has not been invoked consistentiy (contrast eg 
Dillon LJ in Noble at para 40 witii May LJ in ex parte Walsh at 169-70) and in any event 
does not affect the characterisation of a dispute as public/private but is instead to be 
considered in the exercise of the court's discretion to grant a remedy - see per Donaldson 
MR in Walsh at 161. 
" ' Op cit, at 292. See also the Court of Appeal's judgment in Jones v. Swansea CC 
[1989] 3 A l l ER 162 (reversed on otiier grounds [1990] 3 Al l ER 737, HL), discussed by 
Arrowsmith at 286f. 
Para 9. 
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Indeed some of the criteria of reviewability applied in these cases may be designed to reflect 
this limitation.^^ 
See the quotation from ex p. Nangle (above n. 235). Moreover although RAM 
Racecourses involved an individual application, the court intervenes to control decisions of 
"contractual" tribimals in a supervisory capacity and not as a court of appeal - see Lee v. The 
Showmen's Guild of Great Britain [1952] 2 QB 239. Woolf LJ's comments about facmal 
disputes in Noble should not, of course be taken as a qualification to the O'Reilly rule. 
O'Reilly is authority for the view that where a dispute raises issues of public law only, die 
existence of a factual dispute is not enough to allow evasion of the safeguards of Order 53 
for the protection of public authorities. Woolf LJ's concern is to identify when a litigant, 
having a cause of action against an autiiority in private law, is entitied as an alternative to 
proceed by AJR and when, by contrast, he may bring only a civil action. In Roy v. 
Kensington and Westminster Family Practitioner Committee [1992] 2 Al l ER 705, Lord 
Lowry appeared ( at pp. 723, 726) to regard Woolf LJ's comments as of wider application, 
although in that case the plaintiff did have a cause of action. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: B R E A C H OF STATUTORY DUTY 
P U B L I C OR PRIVATE LAW? 
The general position 244 
The question of when a statutory duty sounds in damages in the event of breach is one of 
notoriously uncertain resolution. The "only rule which in all circumstances is valid is that 
the answer must depend on a consideration of the whole Act and the circumstances, 
including the pre-existing law, in which it was enacted".^ ^ Nonetheless the courts have 
developed certain presumptions to assist in their search for this elusive legislative intention, 
as follows.^ 
It seems that, as a general rule, "where an Act creates an obligation and enforces the 
performance in a specified manner....that performance cannot be enforced in any other 
manner".^ ^ Criminal statutes may nonetheless create private law duties if it is apparent that 
the statute was passed for the benefit of a class of persons as opposed to the public at 
large^'. Moreover where a statute creates "public rights" - and it appears that the right to 
the observance of the criminal law is not enough for these purposes '^ - damages may be 
obtained by an individual who suffers special damage as a result of a breach of the 
statute."" 
^ See Stanton, "Breach of Statutory Duty in Tort" (1986); Harding, "Public Duties and 
Public Law" (1989), pp.230-253; Buckley "Liability in Tort for Breach of Statutory Duty" 
(1984) 100 LQR 204. 
Per Lord Simonds in Cutler v. Wandsworth Stadium [1949] AC 398 at 407. See also 
Atkinson v. Newcastle Waterworks (1877) 2 Ex. D. 441. For the correct test of remoteness 
of damage, see Gorris v. Scott (1874) LR 9 Ex 125. 
^ See Lonrho v. Shell Petroleum [1982] AC 173. 
""^  Per Lord Tenterden CJ in Doe dem. Bishop of Rochester v. Bridges (1831) 1 B & Ad 
847 at 859. 
eg Groves v. Lord Wimborne [1898] 2 QB 402. 
^ ' Nor, it would appear, the right to enforce good government through the prerogative 
remedies. See Lonrho v. Shell (above) at 185-6. 
Ibid. The authority for this was said by Lord Diplock to be Boyce v. Paddington BC 
[1903] 1 Ch 109. However, as envisaged by Boyce, special damage merely gave to an 
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Statutory duties and public authority defendants. 
The obverse of the presumption that a criminal penalty excludes a remedy in damages is that 
the absence of a specified means of enforcing performance is likely to result in the 
availability of a private law remedy."^ For reasons explained below this is likely to be the 
case where a statute is cast alike on public and private actors. But where a duty is cast 
exclusively upon public authorities, a court is likely to hold that the statute was passed for 
the benefit of the public - even if it is apparently intended to protect a class"^ - and that 
a public law remedy is the only appropriate mode of enforcement."^ 
This approach is neatly illustrated by comparing two cases in which English courts have 
addressed the question in the context of duties imposed by European Community law."^ 
In the first, Garden Cottage Foods, Ltd v. Milk Marketing Boar^^, the House of 
Lords"* inclined to the view that a breach of Article 86 of the EEC Treaty (prohibiting 
the abuse by "undertakings" of a dominant market position in so far as it might afi'ect trade 
between Member States) was capable of sounding in damages. It had been established by the 
individual the standing to seek an injunction in "public rights" cases without the assistance 
of the Attorney-General. Lord Diplock uses special damage in effect to alter the nature of 
the right infringed, thus creating a new category of die tort of breach of statutory duty. See 
further Stanton, op. cit. at 50. 
Lord Tenterden CJ loc. cit.(supra n. 247). 
See eg Hague v. Deputy Governor of Parkhurst Prison [1991] 3 All ER 733 (HL). 
Note tiiat sometimes a remedy of Ministerial complaint will oust even public law 
remedies - see Pasmore v. Oswaldthistle UDC [1898] AC 387. 
Community law states that certain of its provisions (including tiiose discussed infra) 
shall be effective (without the need for legislation by national auUiorities) to create in 
individuals rights to which national courts must give full effect - see Van Gend en Loos Case 
26/62 [1963] ECR 1; Simmenthal Case 106/77 [1978] ECR 629. This could not overcome 
the principle of UK constitutional law that Treaties cannot alter the general law. Accordingly 
the European Communities Act 1972 s. 2(1) states that such "directiy effective" provisions 
of Community law shall have effect in UK courts. Sub-section (2) empowers the Secretary 
of State to make orders bringing into effect in the UK those rules of Community law which 
the Community itself acknowledges require implementing legislation. 
255 [1983] 2 All ER 770. 
Lord Wilberforce dissenting. The matter came up to die House on an interlocutory 
point and it was unnecessary for their Lordships to express a concluded view. 
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Court of Justice of the European Communities (CJEC) that Art. 86 created rights and 
obligations between individuals which national courts were obliged to uphold. It followed, 
said Lord Diplock, that an individual aggrieved by its breach had a cause of action for 
breach of statutory duty against the Board."^ 
This logic is impeccable with regard to Art. 86 - for, with regard to the imposition of 
liability, the mere fact that the defendant is a public authority is irrelevant if, in similar 
circumstances, a private actor might have been liable."* But the logic obviously need not 
apply where the duty in question can only ever be enforced against a public authority - a 
point which the Solicitor General successfully urged upon a majority of the Court of Appeal 
in the second of our two cases, Bourgoin v. Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food."' 
The plaintiffs were French companies which, until August 1981, had imported turkeys into 
the United Kingdom under a general import licence issued by the Minister acting under 
statute. In August the Minister had revoked the licence in so far as it permitted the import 
of turkeys from countries, including France, in which a particular virus affecting poultry was 
controlled by vaccination rather than slaughter. The Commission of the European 
Communities brought proceedings before the Court of Justice contending - successfully - that 
the UK Government was in breach of Article 30 of the EEC Treaty.^ *" Following this 
ruling a further licence was issued and the plaintiffs' trade resumed in November 1982. They 
subsequently brought an action against the Government claiming damages for loss suffered 
in the interim. The Government contended as a preliminary matter that the plaintiff's only 
257 At 775h-j. 
"* "English law fastens not upon principles but upon remedies" (per Lord Wilberforce 
in Davy v. Spelthorne BC [1984] 1 AC at 276). 
" ' [1985] 3 All ER 585. 
Art 30 provides that "Quantitative restrictions on imports and all measures having 
equivalent effect shall...be prohibited between member states". It was established by the 
CJEC in lanelli & Volpi SpA v. Ditta Paolo Meroni Case 74/76 [1977] ECR 557 that Art. 
30 is directly effective to create rights in individuals which national courts must protect. 
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remedy for a breach simpliciter of Article 30^ *' - now academic - was Judicial Review 
quashing the original decision to revoke. 
Paricer and Nourse LJJ agreed. Exploiting the scope afforded by its exclusive nature^ *^ , 
their Lordships held that Art. 30 was appropriately enforced in public law only. The CJEC 
had itself recognised"^ tiie "undesirability, in areas in which choices of action depend on 
judgment, that member states should be hindered in taking...action by the prospect of actions 
for damages if their judgment should ultimately be held to be wrong. "^" The observance 
of Art. 30 plainly required the exercise of judgment on the part of die Government as to 
what measures did or did not fall within it."^ 
It must be stressed that this policy is relevant only where the duty in question is addressed 
exclusively to public authorities. As Lord Diplock pointed out in Garden Cottage^^, it will 
sometimes require a preliminary ruling from the CJEC under Art. 177 of the EEC Treaty to 
determine whetiier a particular pattern of behaviour by an autiiority constitutes an abuse 
within Art. 86. The fact that Art. 86 binds private actors as well as public authorities is 
"^ The Plaintiffs also pleaded that die Minister was in any event guilty of the tort of 
misfeasance in a public office. This, they argued, could be established if the Minister had 
breached a pubtic law duty, aware both that his actions amounted to a breach and diat as a 
result the Plaintiffs would suffer loss. The Minister conceded for die purposes of the 
preliminary proceedings that he had possessed this mental element, but denied that anydiing 
short of malice towards the Plaintiffs was sufficient to attract liability. The Court 
unanimously accepted the Plaintiffs' submissions on this point. 
"^ See especially Nourse LJ at 633a. Note; it appears diat merely because a duty is 
addressed in terms only to Member States does not mean it cannot also bind private actors -
see Art 119 of the Treaty, as interpreted by the CJEC in Defrenne v. Sabena Case 43/75 
[1976] ECR 455. However as Oliver LJ made clear (at 613a) Art 30 is capable of 
implementation only by a member state (although, for reasons explained below, his Lordship 
did not regard this as relevant). 
" ' In Bayerische HNL Vermehrungsbetriebe GmbH Joined Cases 83 and 94/76, 4, 15, 
and 40/77 [1978] ECR 1209 and Koninklijke Scholten Honig NV Case 143/77 [1979] ECR 
3583 (The Isoglucose Case). These were claims for damages against die Council of Ministers 
for loss suffered as the result of invalid measures. 
Per Parker LJ at 628. 
"^ This, as Parker LJ pointed out (at 625c) is more especially true in view of die 
derogations from Art. 30 contained in Art. 36. 
Loc. cit. at 776d. 
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therefore one "vital but imexpressed step"^" in concluding that it is enforceable by award 
of damages.^ ** 
"Special" statutory duties - private law. 
However whilst only "special" statutory duties are enforceable in public law it does not 
follow that no such duty may be enforced by award of damages. For it appears that even 
exclusive statutory duties sound in private law if they are executive, ie duties whose 
implementation does not require the exercise of judgment.^ *' In Cocks v. Thanet DC^ ™ 
the House of Lords held that a housing authority's duty to execute its decision that an 
individual was entitled to accommodation was enforceable in proceedings begim by 
action.^'' 
"Special" statutory duties - the Community impact. 
A considerable extension of the circumstances in which the breach of an exclusive statutory 
duty attracts liability in damages may now have been effected by developments in 
Community law. How might this be? 
Per Lord Wilberforce (dissenting) in Garden Cottage at 783f, suggesting that another 
such step was the refusal of the majority to believe that Community law might engender a 
sui generis cause of action for an injunction against private actors not backed by the 
possibility of an award of damages. 
Compare An Bord Bainne Co-op v. Irish Dairy Board [1984] 2 CMLR 584 
(Proceedings to enforce both Art. 86 and a Council Directive addressed only to Member 
States held to raise issues of public and private law). 
^*'The notion of "judgment" in this context appears to embrace only those choices which 
are of a quintessentially governmental character. Accordingly a duty to keep school premises 
"reasonably safe" is to be regarded as executive for these purposes - see Cane [1981] PL 11. 
270 [1982] 3 AUER 1135. 
Note that damages were not available to an applicant in respect of an ultra vires and 
unfavourable decision regarding his entitlement. To hold otherwise, said Lord Bridge, would 
have involved the court in deciding that not only was an adverse decision invalid, but that 
the authority acting lawfully would certainly have decided that the applicant fulfilled the 
criteria of entitlement. This is substantially the same consideration that motivated the 
majority in Bourgoin. 
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The approach of the majority in Bourgoin means that ordinarily where an individual suffers 
loss through interference with a Community law right which is by its nature enforceable only 
against the State he cannot recover damages."^  But, as Oliver LJ acknowledged '^^ , it is 
accurate to say that he is unable to enforce his Community rights for this period only if Art. 
30 constitutes a duty owed in private law. 
In holding as they did, Parker and Nourse LJJ took advantage of die rule, well established 
in Community jurisprudence"'*, that the remedies available in national courts to enforce 
Community rights need only be no less effective dian those available to enforce analogous 
rights under domestic law (the principle of non-discrimination)"^. A domestic statute in 
the terms of Art. 30 would be construed as conferring public law rights and die result 
therefore followed. 
Oliver LJ, however, felt constrained to interpret Art. 30 differendy."* Public law rights 
were those enjoyed by any member of the public with sufficient locus standi to go to court 
to correct the misuse of administrative power. An "individual right""' was die antidiesis 
of such a right and could only describe the right of a person not to suffer loss as die result 
of a breach of die law. This, moreover, appeared to be implicit in the jurisprudence of die 
"^ A degree of comfort is to be found in the rule that full interlocutory relief must be 
available to an applicant in appropriate circumstances to prevent further, and possibly 
unlawful, loss being sustained pending die final outcome of proceedings to enforce 
Community rights - see Factortame [1991] 1 All ER 70. 
"^at611g. 
See eg Rewe v. Hauptzollamt Kiel Case 158/80 [1981] ECR 1805. 
"^ There is one qualification to this, viz. that national rules of procedure must not be so 
adapted as to make it impossible in practice to enforce Community law rights (see 
Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v. Ariete SpA Case 811/79 [1980] ECR 2545). 
Thus Community rights may be enforceable by remedies which would not avail an applicant 
complaining of the infringement of domestic rights - see eg the Factortame saga, below n. 
"* His Lordship reached his conclusion with reluctance for die reasons which die 
majority regarded as compelling - see 616g et seq. Neidier Paiker LJ nor Nourse LJ were 
embarrassed by die language of individual rights "for an individual right may be a right in 
private law or in public law" (63If). 
" ' Above n. 260. 
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Court of Justice.^ ''* Such rights were characterised in UK law as private law rights, and to 
deny the full range of remedies - including damages - for their protection would violate the 
principles of full effect and non-discrimination. The difference between Garden Cottage and 
the present case - though valid^^' - gave way to Community jurisprudence. 
It now seems tiiat the scope now exists for a court to prefer the approach of Oliver LJ to that 
of his bretiiren.^ *" The reason is the recent decision of the Court of Justice in Francovich 
and Bonifaci v. Italy?*^ This establishes tiiat where the enforceability of a Community 
See also Simmenthal (supra n. 254) where the CJEC asserted tiiat Community law 
rights should be given effect "from the date of their entry into force" (para 22). The views 
of the Paricer and Nourse LJJ are not irreconcilable with tiiis assertion - all depends on tiie 
nature of the right - but the language is significant. 
Oliver LJ would have construed a domestic statute in the terms of Art. 30 as 
enforceable in public law only - see 619b. 
The issue is now before the Divisional Court as a sequel to the Factortame litigation 
(for discussion see Toth (1990) 27 CMLRev 573; Gravells [1989] PL 568 and [1991] PL 
180). Spanish fishermen claimed that Community law gave them a right to register their 
catches against UK fishing quotas, and that the Merchant Shipping Act 1988, which 
purported to deprive them of this right, was therefore to be set aside. The Divisional Court 
made a reference to the Court of Justice under Art. 177 of the EEC Treaty to determine the 
extent of the applicants' Community rights and granted them an interiocutory injunction 
restraining the Secretary of State from enforcing tiie Act in the meantime (an anticipated 
period of approximately two years). The House of Lords [1989] 2 All ER 692 considered 
that the Divisional Court had no power to grant the injunction, for two reasons. First, s.21 
of the Crown Proceedings Act 1947 prohibited the granting of injimctions against a Minister. 
Secondly, the Court could not make an order temporarily depriving of its effect an Act 
which might, in the result, be entirely compatible with Community law. The House 
nonetheless conceded that these reasons were subject to any "overriding principle of 
Community law" and made an Art. 177 reference on tiiis point. The Court of Justice [1991] 
1 All ER 70 considered that such a principle did exist, because, if it did not, the possibility 
would arise that the applicants' Community rights would be deprived of their effect for two 
years. The Court therefore said, in effect, that tiie House of Lords was to apply tiie test in 
American Cyanamid v. Ethicon ([1975] 1 All ER 504, HL) to determine the question of 
interim relief unembarrassed by the reasons which it had first found persuasive. The House 
of Lords obliged and made the interlocutory order - see ibid. 
In July 1991 tiie Court of Justice [1991] 3 All ER 769 mled that tiie fishermen could indeed 
register their catches against UK quotas. The matter has therefore returned to tiie Divisional 
Court and the applicants now seek damages for loss suffered whilst tiie issue of interim relief 
was being resolved. Thus tiie question arises as to the correctness of tiie majority views in 
Bourgoin. 
Joined Cases 6/90 and 9/90 (Times 20/11/91). See Barav (1991) 141 NLJ 1584; 
Parker (1992) 108 LQR 181; Greenwood [1992] CLJ 3. 
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directive in national courts depends upon the enactment by the State of implementing 
legislation, an individual who is unable to enforce his rights through the State's failure to 
act may recover damages against the State.^ ^ 
So defined, this new right of action would appear to cover cases where a directive is either 
incapable of direct effect or, in any event, where enforcement is sought against a private 
actor.^ *^  Moreover it may be diought to follow a fortiori diat Francovich applies to a case 
like Bourgoin in which die State positively interferes with directly effective Community 
rights.^^ 
The matter has received the attention of die House of Lords in Kirklees Metropolitan 
Borough Council v. Wickes Building Supplies, Ltcf^^. This case arose as a consequence of 
other proceedings^^ in which their Lordships sought a ruling from die Court of Justice to 
help resolve die question of the compatibility widi Art. 30 of die prohibition against Sunday 
trading contained in die Shops Act 1950, s. 47. In Kirklees die House considered whether 
a local authority seeking an interlocutory injunction to enforce s. 47 in the meantime was 
required to give a cross-undertaking in damages in case it should turn out that Art. 30 had 
the effect claimed by the respondent company. The Court of Appeal, giving judgment before 
Provided always that the directive has as its goal die creation of individual rights -
see Barav, op. cit. at 1585. 
See Marshall v. Southampton AHA [1986] QB 401. For what is a public body for 
diese purposes see Foster v. British Gas pic [1991] 2 All ER 705 (HL); Doughty v. Rolls 
Royce (Times 14/1/92, CA). Note in most cases a national court applying domestic law 
against a private defendant will be obliged to interpret diat law in the light of die wording 
and purpose of directives operating in the same sphere (Marleasing Case 106/89 [1990] ECR 
1-4135). However EC law itself acknowledges limits to this obligation - see eg Webb v. EMO 
Air Cargo (UK), Ltd [1992] 2 All ER 43 (CA), noted by die audior at (1992) 29 CMLRev 
(forthcoming). 
See eg Vaughan and Randolph in "Constitutional Adjudication in European 
Community and National Law" (eds Curtin and O'Keeffe), p. 225 n. 28; Parker, op. cit. at 
181; Greenwood, op. cit. at 6. 
285 [1992] 3 All ER 717. 
A "leap frog" appeal from die judgment of Hoffmann J in Stoke-on-Trent CC v. B&Q 
Retail, Ltd. [1991] 4 All ER 221. The House of Lords made a reference to die Court of 
Justice. There is no report of their Lordships' reasons for doing so. 
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Francovich, had decided that it was. However Lord Goff ^  considered it probable tiiat 
Francovich gave to an individual affected by the breach of Art. 30 the right to recover 
damages as a final remedy against the Government for its failure to repeal s. 47. It followed 
that to require an undertaking from the Council was both unnecessary and wrong. 
However Lord Goff refused to state unequivocally that Bourgoin was incorrectiy decided and 
entertained in passing tiie idea that Francovich might be confined to the failure by a member 
state to introduce legislation to implement a directive.^ ** If tiiis is so it may be possible to 
limit Francovich to cases where, for example, the breach of Community law is clear, as 
opposed to those in which the observance of Community law requires an exercise of 
judgment This would be consistent with the approach of Commimity law to the question of 
the liability of Community institutions. 
Procedural matters. 
If individual rights under Community law are private rights, it would seem, in accordance 
with the principle of non-discrimination^*', that they wiU be enforceable by ordinary civil 
action in many cases. However tiie position may not always be uncomplicated. Take, for 
example, the facts of Bourgoin itself. There the infringement of Art. 30 took the form of the 
exercise by the Minister of statutory powers. Thus, on the assumption that Art. 30 creates 
private rights, tiie case involved "mixed" issues of public and private law. We have seen in 
chapter 3 that tiie House of Lords has yet to state affirmatively that all public law issues can 
in such cases be litigated by civil action, tiie answer possibly depending on whetiier tiie 
private law content of a claim is more prominent than its public counterpart.^ "' If this 
approach were to prevail, tiien Community law rights could effectively be denied unless tiie 
applicant were to begin proceedings within three months. 
287 Witii whom tiie remainder of tiie House agreed. 
At 734c. Lord Goff, however, observed that tiie Court of Justice had spoken in 
general terms of a right to recover damages for "breaches of Community law attributable to 
a member state". 
Above. 
See the Roy case, discussed in chapter 3. 
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However there is a possible Community law solution. We have noted^" that die non-
discrimination principle is qualified by the fact that national procedures must not be so 
adapted as to make it impossible in practice to enforce Community rights. This includes die 
rule that time limits must be "reasonable".^ '^  It is not, however, clear whether the diree 
montii time limit under Order 53 is unreasonably short.^ *^  
Above n. 275. 
'^^  See Rewe v. Landwirtschaftskammer Saarland Case 33/76 [1976] ECR 1989. 
Quaere: would a claim under Art. 30 ever involve a public law issue? Plainly die 
decision of the Minister in Bourgoin, being one taken under statute, could have been 
challenged by a member of the public who had only a sufficient interest in die matter, as 
opposed to a private right. But it is doubtful whether individuals with private rights under 
Art. 30 would need to challenge the vires of die Minister's action in die same circumstances. 
All that they would need to prove was that the facts pleaded amounted to a breach of Art. 
30 - die issue of private liabdity would not turn on die resolution of a vires point because 
the breach of Art. 30 could never be inti-a vires. This argument may, however, cause 
problems in the operation of the "obverse" of die rule in O'Reilly v. Mackman - see chapters 
1&3. 
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C H A P T E R F I V E : REFORMING PROCEDURAL PUBLIC LAW. 
The foregoing survey has revealed a number of problems associated witii the O'Reilly rule 
and its obverse, the rule in ex parte Walsh. It is helpful briefly to summarise them here. 
The essential difficulty is that the boundary between public and private law cannot be drawn 
with precision. It is fairly clear^ '^  that merely because a case raises an issue of public law 
at tiie level of substantive principle - for example where a breach of tiie rules of natural 
justice is alleged - it wiU not necessarily be a public law case for the purposes of procedure. 
However, beyond this, uncertainty is quickly encountered. 
First, it remains unclear exactiy when a private law dispute will be considered to have a 
sufficient public dimension to enable it to be resolved on an AJR, and when, obversely a 
litigant may fall foul of tiie rule in Walsh^^^ Secondly, tiie courts have yet expressly to 
adopt a coherent approach to the question of when a statutory duty gives rise to correlative 
private rights. The cases do appear to establish that only duties cast uniquely upon public 
authorities will be candidates for enforcement by mandamus. However some "special" 
statutory duties are nonetheless private, and in this connection it is doubtful whether the 
"decision/executive acts" dichotomy outiined in Cocks v. Thanef-^ will bear scrutiny.^ '^  
In any event, statutory duties which are clearly of the "decision-making" variety can 
nonetheless soimd in private law - as Roy's case illustrates. 
A tiiird, and related, problem is that i f a decision to confer a statutory benefit does give rise 
to private rights^'*, what of cases where the benefit is subsequentiy withdrawn? May we 
See especially Purchas LJ in ex parte Walsh at 181. But see B. Walsh [1989] PL at 
149f. 
Chapter 3. 
[1982] 3 AUER 1135 (HL). 
297 ' See recentiy Tower Hamlets LBC v. Ali Independent 10/4/92. For problems witii tiiis 
distinction in the branch of the law concerned witii negligence in tiie exercise of statutory 
functions see Bowman & Bailey [1986] CLJ 430. 
"* In R V. Secretary of State for Transport ex p. Sherriff & Sons, Ltd. (No.s 1 & 2) 
(Times 18/12/1986; Independent 12/1/1988, noted by A.W. Bradley [1987] PL 141 and 
[1989] PL 197) tiie respondent had indicated to tiie applicant tiiat it would pay a statiitory 
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assume that such a decision can always be challenged coUaterally on the basis of Royl And 
i f we can, what of cases where a renewable benefit is not renewed? In fact this problem is 
most likely to arise where the benefit in question is a statotory licence, or some variant 
thereof. Yet it is not even clear that die "two-stage" approach to die vesting of private rights 
adumbrated in Cocks applies at all to such interests. The tenor of die current judicial 
approach '^' suggests that the recipient of a licence enjoys ordy a legitimate expectation diat 
he should continue to enjoy it. Yet there are obvious and strong argimients for allowing a 
licence-holder to recover damages i f his licence is unlawfidly revoked.^ 
Finally we have observed that there remain aspects in which the law relating to collateral 
challenges to public law issues is uncertain.™' 
grant in support of the latter's business. The subsequent decision not to pay die grant was 
overturned on an AJR. The department paid the grant belatedly and it was dien held (in 
No.2) diat interest was not recoverable on die money for die period of delay. The reason was 
diat AJR was not a "proceeding for die recovery of a debt or damages" widiin S.35A of die 
Supreme Court Act 1981. In the circumstances the company's only chance of recovering 
interest was to have brought a civil action. But Professor Bradley ([1989] PL at 199), 
echoing reservations of the judge, doubts whether such an action would have surmounted die 
O'Reilly obstacle. However it seems (from n.6 ibid) that this is because he doubts whether 
there was a "decision" in the Cocks sense sufficient to create private rights. Indeed die facts 
of No.l reveal that the initial indication by the department made a final decision conditional 
upon a number of factors. Accordingly Sherriffdots not undermine die approach in Cocks 
that a decision creates private rights, but instead concerns die question of what constitutes 
a decision. 
See Forsydi "The Provenance and Protection of Legitimate Expectations" [1988] CLJ 
238; Craig "Legitimate Expectations: A Conceptual Analysis" (1992) 108 LQR 79. 
^ The classic exposition remains Charles Reich's "The New Property" (1964) 73 Yale 
LJ 733. Bourgoin v. MAFF [1985] 3 All ER 585 is not necessarily audiority against such 
a proposition, for the licence there in question was a general one that did not enure to the 
benefit of any one individual. The refusal of a licence is certainly a matter of public law 
only - R V. Knowsley MBC ex p. Maguire (Times 26/6/92). 
™' Chap. 2. C.T. Emery (op. cit. above nn. 57, 114) considers diat factors such as die 
competence of inferior courts to decide vires issues are additional values to be put in the 
scales against the private interests of die litigant when considering what is the desirable 
scope of collateral challenge. For a suggested means of accommodating these values see ibid. 
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Declarations and public authorities. 
Another apparent uncertainty, not yet addressed, concerns the declaration as a remedy against 
public authorities in cases not involving a private law cause of action. In O'Reilly Lord 
Diplock appeared to state^ that tiie mode of proceeding adopted in Pyx Granite, Ltd v. 
Ministry of Housing and Local Governmenf^^ would be acceptable even in the light of tiie 
reforms to Order 53. 
Pyx was a case where the company sought declarations that a Ministerial decision granting 
Umited planning permission to undertake quarrying operations was invalid, and that no hmits 
could be set. The company succeeded despite having suffered no interference witii its private 
rights sufficient to justify the award even of a quia timet injunction. This is unremarkable 
because, despite initial hesitation^, it has long been established tiiat the declaration as a 
remedy in civil proceedings is not so confined.™' This is how Order 15 r.l6 has been 
interpreted, permitting the court to "make binding declarations of right whether any 
consequential relief is or could be claimed, or not." But if tiiis is tiie case, why was tiie 
declaration sought by the prisoners in O'Reilly available only by way of AJR? 
In Gillick v. West Norfolk and Wisbech AHA^^ tiie House of Lords was asked by the 
plaintiff to declare tiiat the contents of a circular promulgated by a government department 
were invalid as containing advice that was erroneous in law. All but one of their Lordships 
felt it necessary to consider whetiier tiie plaintiff's claim should not have been brought by 
AJR under O'Reilly?^'' Indeed Lord Bridge^* considered tiiat because tiie plaintiff could 
^ [1982] 3 AUER at 1131, 1133. 
™^  [1960] AC 260. 
eg London Association of Shipowners and Brokers v. London and India Docks Joint 
Committee [1892] 3 Ch.D 242. 
™' See tiie majority judgments in Guaranty Trust Co. of New York v. Hannay & Co. 
[1915] 2 KB 536 (CA). 
306 [1985] 3 AU ER 402. 
Lords Fraser and Scarman considered tiiat AJR was an appropriate course; Lords 
Bridge and Templeman considered it the appropriate course. 
™* at 426b-c. 
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assert no private right against the defendant relief should have been sought in public law. 
Professor Wade doubts whether O'Reilly had anything to do with the claim in Gillick and 
considers that, as weU as Pyx Granite, Dyson v. Attorney - Generaf^ would also escape 
the O'Reilly general rule. So we return to our problem - what declarations are covered by 
O'Reillyl 
In bodi Pyx and Dyson die plaintiff could have mounted his challenge by way of defence to 
proceedings brought to enforce respectively die decision and die demand. This is obvious 
in Dyson's case - less so in Pyx. We have noted^'° in an analogous case that a refusal to 
grant a licence cannot ordinarily be challenged by way of defence to criminal proceedings 
brought against a defendant who engages in the regulated activity in question. However as 
Lord Diplock pointed out in O'Reilly^^^ Pyx on analysis appears to have been concerned 
with declaring that the plaintiffs had a lawful right to undertake quarrying activities widiout 
the need to obtain any decision from the Minister. The company would not, therefore, have 
had to surmount the obstacle diat a successful challenge does not create die necessary licence 
- for the necessity of the licence was the very point at issue.^ '^  Given, then, that in both 
Pyx and Dyson the plaintiff could have avoided the procedural requirements of Order 53 
defending himself in enforcement proceedings, it would be strange indeed to require him to 
mount an attack by AJR. 
On this basis, O'Reilly certainly applies to declarations that a hcence '^\ housing '^*, 
™' Chap. 1. Wade's views appear at A.L. p. 683, observing diat (for die reasons 
explained at n. 94 ibid) the effect of Gillick's case might now be to require Dyson, diough 
not Pyx, to have proceeded by AJR. 
'^^  Above chap. 2. 
At1131g. 
'^^  As Rubinstein points out ("Jurisdiction and Illegality" p. 37), the need to create a 
licence arises only in cases involving what he terms "negative" decisions, ie decisions not 
to confer a benefit. "Positive" decisions, purporting to alter existing rights, have always been 
challengeable collaterally (ibid at 36). Pyx was such a case. As Viscount Simonds pointed 
out (at 287), whedier die Minister's decision was valid turned on to what extent die statute 
cut down die company's common law right to quarry. 
Absent, at least, a clause such as diat contained in para 28 of Sched 3 to die Local 
Government (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1982 - see the Quietly nn case, discussed in 
chapter 2. 
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remission of sentence or any other statutory benefit has been invalidly refused - all cases 
where, prior to 1977, there was no possibility of a collateral challenge to the decision in 
enforcement proceedings and where certiorari was flie orthodox mode of challenge. 
O'Reilly - should it be overruled? 
But the grey areas outiined above remain and have led, perhaps understandably, to calls for 
O'Reilly to be reconsidered by the House of Lords.^ '^  Their Lordships have shown 
themselves recenfly to be willing to depart from tiieir previous decisions^ '*, however it is 
doubtful whether there is sufficient judicial consensus on the matter seriously to entertain this 
hope.^ '^ 
In any event Professor Wade has argued that tiiere is another, more serious, obstacle to 
attempting to overrule O'Reilly. We have already noted '^* that in some cases AJR must be 
an exclusive procedure, for otiierwise tiie safeguards for public autiiorities contained in it 
would be routinely circumvented. Accordingly to avoid the prospect of at least some measure 
of procedural exclusivity involves dismantiing the leave requirement and short time limit 
contained in the Supreme Court Act 1981.^" Or, to put the same point anoflier way, any 
proposal to overrule O'Reilly given tiie present rules is illogical. 
Cocks V. Thanet (supra). 
"Administrative Justice: Some Necessary Reforms" Report of tiie Committee of tiie 
JUSTICE - All Souls Review at p. 166. The Law Commission's Fifth Programme of Law 
Reform, Item 10 (Judicial Review) places O'Reilly first in a list of topics to be examined. 
Murphy v. Brentwood [1991] 1 AC 398. 
See Lord Bridge in Roy [1992] 1 All ER 705 at 707. 
318 Chap. 1, n. 68. 
See Wade (1989) 105 LQR 315 at 317. The Committee of tiie JUSTICE - All Souls 
Review make tiiis recommendation. Professor Wade believes tiiat if protection for public 
autiiorities against ceratin types of htigation is needed then it can be accommodated in other 
ways - see "Procedure and Prerogative in Public Law" (1985) 101 LQR 180 at 189-90. 
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But i f some cases must be brought by AJR does die line have to be drawn so as to bring 
exclusively within Order 53 all cases brought by private actors^^ raising only issues of 
public law? For some cases quite plainly raise ordy issues of public law - others involve 
some doubt Why not depart from O'Reilly to permit a litigant to proceed by action where 
he makes an honest mistake about the character of the illegality he wishes to challenge? 
Order 53 would remain an exclusive procedure in "clear" cases and Professor Wade's logical 
objection would be met. 
Indeed would this involve a departure from O'Reillyl As Sir Harry Woolf points out^ '^ "in 
his speech in O'Reilly v. Mackman Lord Diplock was careful to refer to a general rule. If 
a titigant who has a valid claim bona fide but wrongly regards a case as not fading widiin 
O'Reilly v. Mackman when it does, the principle should not be allowed to embarrass him." 
Support for the view that Lord Diplock did not intend to trap die litigant who makes an 
innocent mistake may also be found in die use by his Lordship of die language of abuse of 
process. As Forsyth points out^ ^^  it is strange to regard all those who transgress the 
O'Reilly rule as having perpetrated an abuse of process, for the notion of abuse connotes a 
knowing misuse - of which the plaintiffs in O'Reilly itself were apparendy guilty.^" This 
would suggest that the discretion with which the courts have in the past exercised their abuse 
of process jurisdiction is contained in die rule itself. 
Is it wrong, then, to call for the reconsideration of O'Reilly because a "sharp"^^ distinction 
between public and private law cannot be drawn? On die basis of die above a sharp 
distinction is unnecessary. But what of Cocks v. Thanetl In that case the plaintiffs claim 
was struck out by their Lordships despite die fact diat Lord Bridge had to overrule one of 
his own judgments from the Court of Appeal^" in order to hold that the matter in question 
ie excluding die Attorney-General, local audiorities acting under s.222 of die Local 
Government Act etc. 
"Judicial Review: A Possible Programme For Reform" [1992] PL 221 at 231. 
[1985] CLJ 415 at 419. 
[1982] 3 All ER at 134. 
JUSTICE - All Souls Review at 150. 
^" De Falco v. Crawley BC [1980] 1 All ER 913. 
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raised issues of public law only. Surely in such a difficult case the flexibility inherent in the 
general rule should have operated to permit the plaintiff to continue in civil proceedings, 
even if their Lordships were to indicate that in future AJR would be the only permissible 
mode of challenge. Is Cocks simply inconsistent with the O'Reilly rule as properly 
understood? 
But Cocks was decided on the same day and by the same panel of judges that decided 
O'Reilly. This fact seems fatal to suggestions that their Lordships in O'Reilly intended to lay 
down a flexible rule. Instead it appears to indicate that Lord Diplock intended the policy of 
protecting public authorities to prevail even over the interests of litigants who proceed in 
error. If this is the case, the House of Lords should as early as possible reassess the balance 
of these two considerations. This, for the reasons explained above, can be achieved under 
the present s.31 of the Supreme Court Act 1981. 
Remaining problems. 
Unfortunately this reform would not solve every difficulty. For it would remain, presumably, 
to be settled what degree of locus standi - special damage or sufficient interest - a plaintiff 
would have to prove to obtain relief by civil action. Bans v. BethelF^ re-established the 
former test as the correct one. However these would be cases where, had the applicant 
guessed correctly, he would need to prove only a sufficient interest under s.31(3) of the 
Supreme Court Act 1981. Given the preparedness of the court on our present assumption to 
overlook the plaintiff's error to the point of allowing him to proceed by action, it would be 
anomalous then for it to use that error to penalise the plaintiff by imposing a stricter standing 
test. 
A final difficulty is this. Prior to O'Reilly there were some indications^ '^ that the practice 
of awarding injunctions in civil proceedings in public law cases misled some judges into 
326 [1982] Ch 294. 
eg Meade v. Haringey LBC [1979] 2 AU ER 1016 especially per Lord Denning MR 
at 1023 and Sir Stanley Rees at 1033-4; Lonrho v. Shell Petroleum [1982] AC 173 (as 
explained in chap. 4. It seems clear that Lord Diplock would not have regarded 
administrative law duties as sufficient, when accompanied by special damage, to create 
private rights - but the confusion of rights and remedies is interesting). 
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assuming that damages were available where the circumstances warranted it. This, of 
course, amounts to an abandonment of the public/private law divide as it is traditionally 
understood. This danger could only increase were a reform such as that canvassed here 
actually to be implemented - for we are imagining circumstances in which public law cases 
can proceed by action precisely because their pubUc character is unclear. Accordingly there 
would need to be devised some way of "flagging" for later courts cases which are private 
at the level of procedure but nonetheless involve only public duties. This could be achieved 
by permitting the free transfer of such cases into the Crown Office list. This simple reform 
could be effected by the Rules Committee of the Supreme Court without the need for 
legislative intervention. 
Presumably on the basis of what is now s.50 of the Supreme Court Act 1981. 
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